An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
In the first place, I shall consider the wrong judgments men make of
FUTURE good and evil, whereby their desires are misled. For, as to
PRESENT happiness and misery, when that alone comes into consideration,
and the consequences are quite removed, a man never chooses amiss: he
knows what best pleases him, and that he actually prefers. Things in
their present enjoyment are what they seem: the apparent and real good
are, in this case, always the same. For the pain or pleasure being just
so great and no greater than it is felt, the present good or evil is
really so much as it appears. And therefore were every action of ours
concluded within itself, and drew no consequences after it, we should
undoubtedly never err in our choice of good: we should always
infallibly prefer the best. Were the pains of honest industry, and of
starving with hunger and cold set together before us, nobody would be
in doubt which to choose: were the satisfaction of a lust and the joys
of heaven offered at once to any one’s present possession, he would not
balance, or err in the determination of his choice.
61. Our wrong judgments have regard to future good and evil only.
But since our voluntary actions carry not all the happiness and misery
that depend on them along with them in their present performance, but
are the precedent causes of good and evil, which they draw after them,
and bring upon us, when they themselves are past and cease to be; our
desires look beyond our present enjoyments, and carry the mind out to
ABSENT GOOD, according to the necessity which we think there is of it,
to the making or increase of our happiness. It is our opinion of such a
necessity that gives it its attraction: without that, we are not moved
by absent good. For, in this narrow scantling of capacity which we are
accustomed to and sensible of here, wherein we enjoy but one pleasure
at once, which, when all uneasiness is away, is, whilst it lasts,
sufficient to make us think ourselves happy, it is not all remote and
even apparent good that affects us. Because the indolency and enjoyment
we have, sufficing for our present happiness, we desire not to venture
the change; since we judge that we are happy already, being content,
and that is enough. For who is content is happy. But as soon as any new
uneasiness comes in, this happiness is disturbed, and we are set afresh
on work in the pursuit of happiness.
62. From a wrong Judgment of what makes a necessary Part of their
Happiness.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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