An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
is to be given? I have forborne to mention anything of the certainty or
probability of a future state, designing here to show the wrong
judgment that any one must allow he makes, upon his own principles,
laid how he pleases, who prefers the short pleasures of a vicious life
upon any consideration, whilst he knows, and cannot but be certain,
that a future life is at least possible.
73. Recapitulation—Liberty of indifferency.
To conclude this inquiry into human liberty, which, as it stood before,
I myself from the beginning fearing, and a very judicious friend of
mine, since the publication, suspecting to have some mistake in it,
though he could not particularly show it me, I was put upon a stricter
review of this chapter. Wherein lighting upon a very easy and scarce
observable slip I had made, in putting one seemingly indifferent word
for another that discovery opened to me this present view, which here,
in this second edition, I submit to the learned world, and which, in
short, is this: LIBERTY is a power to act or not to act, according as
the mind directs. A power to direct the operative faculties to motion
or rest in particular instances is that which we call the WILL. That
which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any
change of operation is SOME PRESENT UNEASINESS, which is, or at least
is always accompanied with that of DESIRE. Desire is always moved by
evil, to fly it: because a total freedom from pain always makes a
necessary part of our happiness: but every good, nay, every greater
good, does not constantly move desire, because it may not make, or may
not be taken to make, any necessary part of our happiness. For all that
we desire, is only to be happy. But, though this general desire of
happiness operates constantly and invariably, yet the satisfaction of
any particular desire CAN BE SUSPENDED from determining the will to any
subservient action, till we have maturely examined whether the
particular apparent good which we then desire makes a part of our real
happiness, or be consistent or inconsistent with it. The result of our
judgment upon that examination is what ultimately determines the man;
who could not be FREE if his will were determined by anything but his
own desire, guided by his own judgment.
74. Active and passive power, in motions and in thinking.
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