An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
Amongst such kind of collective ideas are to be counted most part of
artificial things, at least such of them as are made up of distinct
substances: and, in truth, if we consider all these collective ideas
aright, as ARMY, CONSTELLATION, UNIVERSE, as they are united into so
many single ideas, they are but the artificial draughts of the mind;
bringing things very remote, and independent on one another, into one
view, the better to contemplate and discourse on them, united into one
conception, and signified by one name. For there are no things so
remote, nor so contrary, which the mind cannot, by this art of
composition, bring into one idea; as is visible in that signified by
the name UNIVERSE.
CHAPTER XXV.
OF RELATION.
1. Relation, what.
BESIDES the ideas, whether simple or complex, that the mind has of
things as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their
comparison one with another. The understanding, in the consideration of
anything, is not confined to that precise object: it can carry any idea
as it were beyond itself, or at least look beyond it, to see how it
stands in conformity to any other. When the mind so considers one
thing, that it does as it were bring it to, and set it by another, and
carries its view from one to the other—this is, as the words import,
RELATION and RESPECT; and the denominations given to positive things,
intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts
beyond the subject itself denominated, to something distinct from it,
are what we call RELATIVES; and the things so brought together,
RELATED. Thus, when the mind considers Caius as such a positive being,
it takes nothing into that idea but what really exists in Caius; v.g.
when I consider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex
idea of the species, man. So likewise, when I say Caius is a white man,
I have nothing but the bare consideration of a man who hath that white
colour. But when I give Caius the name HUSBAND, I intimate some other
person; and when I give him the name WHITER, I intimate some other
thing: in both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and
there are two things brought into consideration. And since any idea,
whether simple or complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings
two things together, and as it were takes a view of them at once,
though still considered as distinct: therefore any of our ideas may be
the foundation of relation. As in the above-mentioned instance, the
contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia is the occasion of the
denomination and relation of husband; and the colour white the occasion
why he is said to be whiter than free-stone.
2. Ideas of relations without correlative Terms, not easily
apprehended.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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