An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
Secondly, This further may be considered concerning relation, that
though it be not contained in the real existence of things, but
something extraneous and superinduced, yet the ideas which relative
words stand for are often clearer and more distinct than of those
substances to which they do belong. The notion we have of a father or
brother is a great deal clearer and more distinct than that we have of
a man; or, if you will, PATERNITY is a thing whereof it is easier to
have a clear idea, than of HUMANITY; and I can much easier conceive
what a friend is, than what God; because the knowledge of one action,
or one simple idea, is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a
relation; but to the knowing of any substantial being, an accurate
collection of sundry ideas is necessary. A man, if he compares two
things together, can hardly be supposed not to know what it is wherein
he compares them: so that when he compares any things together, he
cannot but have a very clear idea of that relation. THE IDEAS, THEN, OF
RELATIONS, ARE CAPABLE AT LEAST OF BEING MORE PERFECT AND DISTINCT IN
OUR MINDS THAN THOSE OF SUBSTANCES. Because it is commonly hard to know
all the simple ideas which are really in any substance, but for the
most part easy enough to know the simple ideas that make up any
relation I think on, or have a name for: v.g. comparing two men in
reference to one common parent, it is very easy to frame the ideas of
brothers, without having yet the perfect idea of a man. For significant
relative words, as well as others, standing only for ideas; and those
being all either simple, or made up of simple ones, it suffices for the
knowing the precise idea the relative term stands for, to have a clear
conception of that which is the foundation of the relation; which may
be done without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is
attributed to. Thus, having the notion that one laid the egg out of
which the other was hatched, I have a clear idea of the relation of DAM
and CHICK between the two cassiowaries in St. James’s Park; though
perhaps I have but a very obscure and imperfect idea of those birds
themselves.
9. Relations all terminate in simple Ideas.
Thirdly, Though there be a great number of considerations wherein
things may be compared one with another, and so a multitude of
relations, yet they all terminate in, and are concerned about those
simple ideas, either of sensation or reflection, which I think to be
the whole materials of all our knowledge. To clear this, I shall show
it in the most considerable relations that we have any notion of; and
in some that seem to be the most remote from sense or reflection: which
yet will appear to have their ideas from thence, and leave it past
doubt that the notions we have of them are but certain simple ideas,
and so originally derived from sense or reflection.
10. Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subject denominated, are
relative.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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