An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
But though the same immaterial substance or soul does not alone,
wherever it be, and in whatsoever state, make the same MAN; yet it is
plain, consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended—should it be to
ages past—unites existences and actions very remote in time into the
same PERSON, as well as it does the existences and actions of the
immediately preceding moment: so that whatever has the consciousness of
present and past actions, is the same person to whom they both belong.
Had I the same consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah’s flood, as
that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or as that I write
now, I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that saw the
Thames overflowed last winter, and that viewed the flood at the general
deluge, was the same SELF,—place that self in what SUBSTANCE you
please—than that I who write this am the same MYSELF now whilst I write
(whether I consist of all the same substance material or immaterial, or
no) that I was yesterday. For as to this point of being the same self,
it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or
other substances—I being as much concerned, and as justly accountable
for any action that was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me
now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment.
19. Self depends on Consciousness, not on Substance.
SELF is that conscious thinking thing,—whatever substance made up of,
(whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters
not)—which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of
happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that
consciousness extends. Thus every one finds that, whilst comprehended
under that consciousness, the little finger is as much a part of
himself as what is most so. Upon separation of this little finger,
should this consciousness go along with the little finger, and leave
the rest of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the
person, the same person; and self then would have nothing to do with
the rest of the body. As in this case it is the consciousness that goes
along with the substance, when one part is separate from another, which
makes the same person, and constitutes this inseparable self: so it is
in reference to substances remote in time. That with which the
consciousness of this present thinking thing CAN join itself, makes the
same person, and is one self with it, and with nothing else; and so
attributes to itself, and owns all the actions of that thing, as its
own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no further; as every one
who reflects will perceive.
20. Persons, not Substances, the Objects of Reward and Punishment.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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