An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
told, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones,
takes it upon trust, without examining the demonstration; and may yield
his assent as a probable opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth of
it; which yet his faculties, if carefully employed, were able to make
clear and evident to him. But this only, by the by, to show how much
OUR KNOWLEDGE DEPENDS UPON THE RIGHT USE OF THOSE POWERS NATURE HATH
BESTOWED UPON US, and how little upon SUCH INNATE PRINCIPLES AS ARE IN
VAIN SUPPOSED TO BE IN ALL MANKIND FOR THEIR DIRECTION; which all men
could not but know if they were there, or else they would be there to
no purpose. And which since all men do not know, nor can distinguish
from other adventitious truths, we may well conclude there are no such.
24. Men must think and know for themselves.
What censure doubting thus of innate principles may deserve from men,
who will be apt to call it pulling up the old foundations of knowledge
and certainty, I cannot tell;—I persuade myself at least that the way I
have pursued, being conformable to truth, lays those foundations surer.
This I am certain, I have not made it my business either to quit or
follow any authority in the ensuing Discourse. Truth has been my only
aim; and wherever that has appeared to lead, my thoughts have
impartially followed, without minding whether the footsteps of any
other lay that way or not. Not that I want a due respect to other men’s
opinions; but, after all, the greatest reverence is due to truth: and I
hope it will not be thought arrogance to say, that perhaps we should
make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative
knowledge, if we sought it in the fountain, IN THE CONSIDERATION OF
THINGS THEMSELVES; and made use rather of our own thoughts than other
men’s to find it. For I think we may as rationally hope to see with
other men’s eyes, as to know by other men’s understandings. So much as
we ourselves consider and comprehend of truth and reason, so much we
possess of real and true knowledge. The floating of other men’s
opinions in our brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, though
they happen to be true. What in them was science, is in us but
opiniatrety; whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names, and
do not, as they did, employ our own reason to understand those truths
which gave them reputation. Aristotle was certainly a knowing man, but
nobody ever thought him so because he blindly embraced, and confidently
vented the opinions of another. And if the taking up of another’s
principles, without examining them, made not him a philosopher, I
suppose it will hardly make anybody else so. In the sciences, every one
has so much as he really knows and comprehends. What he believes only,
and takes upon trust, are but shreds; which, however well in the whole
piece, make no considerable addition to his stock who gathers them.
Such borrowed wealth, like fairy money, though it were gold in the hand
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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