An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
This is the reason why—though we cannot believe it impossible to God to
make a creature with other organs, and more ways to convey into the
understanding the notice of corporeal things than those five, as they
are usually counted, which he has given to man—yet I think it is not
possible for any MAN to imagine any other qualities in bodies,
howsoever constituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides
sounds, tastes, smells, visible and tangible qualities. And had mankind
been made but with four senses, the qualities then which are the
objects of the fifth sense had been as far from our notice,
imagination, and conception, as now any belonging to a sixth, seventh,
or eighth sense can possibly be;—which, whether yet some other
creatures, in some other parts of this vast and stupendous universe,
may not have, will be a great presumption to deny. He that will not set
himself proudly at the top of all things, but will consider the
immensity of this fabric, and the great variety that is to be found in
this little and inconsiderable part of it which he has to do with, may
be apt to think that, in other mansions of it, there may be other and
different intelligent beings, of whose faculties he has as little
knowledge or apprehension as a worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet
hath of the senses or understanding of a man; such variety and
excellency being suitable to the wisdom and power of the Maker. I have
here followed the common opinion of man’s having but five senses;
though, perhaps, there may be justly counted more;—but either
supposition serves equally to my present purpose.
CHAPTER III.
OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF SENSE.
1. Division of simple ideas.
The better to conceive the ideas we receive from sensation, it may not
be amiss for us to consider them, in reference to the different ways
whereby they make their approaches to our minds, and make themselves
perceivable by us.
FIRST, then, There are some which come into our minds BY ONE SENSE
ONLY.
SECONDLY, There are others that convey themselves into the mind BY MORE
SENSES THAN ONE.
THIRDLY, Others that are had from REFLECTION ONLY.
FOURTHLY, There are some that make themselves way, and are suggested to
the mind BY ALL THE WAYS OF SENSATION AND REFLECTION.
We shall consider them apart under these several heads.
Ideas of one Sense.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account