An Essay on the Evils of Popular IgnoranceFoster, John
Philosophy
An Essay on the Evils of Popular Ignorance
Foster, John
Education; Great Britain -- Social conditions -- 19th century; Literacy; Missions -- India; Religious education
The instructor attempts a personal application, endeavoring to give the
disturbed conscience a rational direction, and a distinct cognizance. But
he finds, as he might expect to find, that a conscience without knowledge
has never taken but a very small portion of the man's habits of life under
its jurisdiction; and that it is a most hopeless thing to attempt to send
it back reinforced, to reclaim and conquer, through all the past, the
whole extent of its rightful but never assumed dominion. So feeble and
confined in the function of judgment through which it must see and act, it
is especially incapable of admitting the monitor's estimate of the measure
of guilt involved in omission, and in an irreligious state of the mind, as
an exceedingly grave addition to the account of criminal action. The man
is totally and honestly unable to conceive of the substantial guilt of
anything of which he can ask, what injury it has done to anybody. This
single point--whether positive harm has been done to any one--comprehends
the whole essence and sum of the conscious accountableness of very
ignorant people. Material wrong, _very_ material wrong, to their fellow
mortals, they have a conscience that they should not do; a conscience,
however, which they would deem it hard to be obliged to maintain entire
even to this confined extent; and which therefore admits some compromise
and gives some license, with respect especially to any kind of wrong which
has the extenuation, as they deem it, of being commonly practised in their
class; and against which there is a sort of understanding that each one
must take the best care he can of himself. At this confine, so undecidedly
marked, of practical, tangible wrong, these very ignorant persons lose the
sense of obligation, and feel absolved from any further jurisdiction. So
coarse and narrow a conscience as to what they _do_, is not likely to be
refined and extended into a cognizance of what they _are_. As for a duty
absolute in the nature of things, or as owing to themselves, in respect to
their own nature, or as imposed by the Almighty--_that their minds should
be in a certain prescribed state_--there does really require a perfectly
new manner of the action of intellect to enable them to apprehend its
existence. And this habitual insensibility to any jurisdiction over their
internal state, now meets, in its consequences, the supposed instructor.
In consideration of the vast importance of this part of a rational
creature's accountableness, and partly, too, from a desire to avoid the
invidiousness of appearing as a judicial censor of the sick man's
practical conduct, he insists in an especial manner on this subject of the
state within, endeavoring to expose that dark world by the light of
religion to the sick man's conscience. But to give in an hour the
_understanding_ which it requires the discipline of many years to render
competent! How vain the attempt! The man's sense of guilt fixes almost
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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