But what would appear to make this matter absolutely certain is, that unless the prohibition that "no bailiff, &c., _of ours_ shall hold pleas of our crown," apply to all officers of the king, justices as well as others, it would be wholly nugatory for any practical or useful purpose, because the prohibition could be evaded by the king, at any time, by simply changing the titles of his officers. Instead of calling them "sheriffs, coroners, constables and bailiffs," he could call them "_justices_," or anything else he pleased; and this prohibition, so important to the liberty of the people, would then be entirely defeated. The king also could make and unmake "justices" at his pleasure; and if he could appoint any officers whatever to preside over juries in criminal trials, he could appoint any tool that he might at any time find adapted to his purpose. It was as easy to make justices of Jeffreys and Scroggs, as of any other material; and to have prohibited all the king's officers, _except his justices_, from presiding in criminal trials, would therefore have been mere fool's play. We can all perhaps form some idea, though few of us will be likely to form any adequate idea, of what a different thing the trial by jury would have been _in practice_, and of what would have been the difference to the liberties of England, for five hundred years last past, had this prohibition of Magna Carta, upon the king's officers sitting in the trial of criminal cases, been observed. The principle of this chapter of Magna Carta, as applicable to the governments of the United States of America, forbids that any officer appointed either by the executive or _legislative_ power, or dependent upon them for their salaries, or responsible to them by impeachment, should preside over a jury in criminal trials. To have the trial a legal (that is, a _common law_) and true trial by jury, the presiding officers must be chosen by the people, and be entirely free from all dependence upon, and all accountability to, the executive and legislative branches of the government.[94] [Footnote 87: The proofs of this principle of the common law have already been given on page 120, _note_. There is much confusion and contradiction among authors as to the manner in which sheriffs and other officers were appointed; some maintaining that they were appointed by the king, others that they were elected by the people. I imagine that both these opinions are correct, and that several of the king's officers bore the same official names as those chosen by the people; and that this is the cause of the confusion that has arisen on the subject.