"Because that the people of the realm have suffered many evils and mischiefs, for that sheriffs of divers counties, by virtue of commissions and general writs granted to them at their own suit, for their singular profit to gain of the people, have made and taken divers inquests to cause to indict the people at their will, and have taken fine and ransom of them to their own use, and have delivered them; whereas such persons indicted were not brought before the king's justices to have their deliverance, it is accorded and established, for to eschew all such evils and mischiefs, that such commissions and writs before this time made shall be utterly repealed, and that from henceforth no such commissions shall be granted."--_St. 28 Edward III._, ch. 9, (1354.) How silly to suppose that the illegality of these commissions to try criminal cases, could have been avoided by simply granting them to persons under the title of "_justices_," instead of granting them to "_sheriffs_." The statute was evidently a cheat, or at least designed as such, inasmuch as it virtually asserts the right of the king to appoint his tools, under the name of "justices," to try criminal cases, while it _disavows_ his right to appoint them under the name of "sheriffs." Millar says: "When the king's bench came to have its usual residence at Westminster, the sovereign was induced to _grant special commissions, for trying particular crimes_, in such parts of the country as were found most convenient; and this practice was _gradually_ modelled into a regular appointment of certain commissioners, empowered, at stated seasons, to perform circuits over the kingdom, and to hold courts in particular towns, for the trial of all sorts of crimes. These judges of the circuit, however, _never obtained an ordinary jurisdiction, but continued, on every occasion, to derive their authority from two special commissions_: that of _oyer and terminer_, by which they were appointed to hear and determine all treasons, felonies and misdemeanors, within certain districts; and that of _gaol delivery_, by which they were directed to try every prisoner confined in the gaols of the several towns falling under their inspection."--_Millar's Hist. View of Eng. Gov._, vol. 2, ch. 7, p. 282. The following extract from Gilbert shows to what lengths of usurpation the kings would sometimes go, in their attempts to get the judicial power out of the hands of the people, and entrust it to instruments of their own choosing: