The reason why these courts are so intensely servile and corrupt, is, that they are not only parts of, but the veriest creatures of, the very governments whose oppressions they are thus seeking to uphold. They receive their offices and salaries from, and are impeachable and removable by, the very governments upon whose acts they affect to sit in judgment. Of course, no one with his eyes open ever places himself in a position so incompatible with the liberty of declaring his honest opinion, unless he do it with the intention of becoming a mere instrument in the hands of the government for the execution of all its oppressions. As proof of this, look at the judicial history of England for the last five hundred years, and of America from its settlement. In all that time (so far as I know, or presume) no bench of judges, (probably not even any single judge,) dependent upon the legislature that passed the statute, has ever declared a single _penal_ statute invalid, on account of its being in conflict either with the common law, which the judges in England have been sworn to preserve, or with the written constitutions, (recognizing men's natural rights,) which the American judges were under oath to maintain. Every oppression, every atrocity even, that has ever been enacted in either country, by the legislative power, in the shape of a criminal law, (or, indeed, in almost any other shape,) has been as sure of a sanction from the judiciary that was dependent upon, and impeachable by, the legislature that enacted the law, as if there were a physical necessity that the legislative enactment and the judicial sanction should go together. Practically speaking, the sum of their decisions, all and singular, has been, that there are no limits to the power of the government, and that the people have no rights except what the government pleases to allow to them. It is extreme folly for a people to allow such dependent, servile, and perjured creatures to sit either in civil or criminal trials; but to allow them to sit in criminal trials, and judge of the people's liberties, is not merely fatuity,--it is suicide.] [Footnote 92: Coke, speaking of the word _bailiffs_, as used in the statute of 1 _Westminster_, ch. 35, (1275,) says: "Here _bailiffs_ are taken for the _judges of the court_, as manifestly appeareth hereby."--2 _Inst._, 229. Coke also says, "It is a maxim in law, _aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa_, (no one ought to be judge in his own cause;) and therefore a fine levied before the _baylifes of Salop_ was reversed, because one of the _baylifes_ was party to the fine, _quia non potest esse judex et pars_," (because one cannot be _judge_ and party.)--_1 Inst._, 141 a. In the statute of Gloucester, ch. 11 and 12, (1278,) "the mayor and _bailiffs_ of London (undoubtedly chosen by the people, or at any rate not appointed by the king) are manifestly spoken of as _judges_, or magistrates, holding _jury_ trials, as follows: