An ethical philosophy of life presented in its main outlinesAdler, Felix
Religion
An ethical philosophy of life presented in its main outlines
Adler, Felix
Ethics; Philosophy, Modern
One circumstance especially which at first sight seems favorable to
Kant’s contention turns against him. He has been assailed on the
ground that his categorical imperative is a fiction, that no such
an imperative plays a rôle in the actual experience of men. On the
contrary, the actual experience of men is replete with categorical
imperatives. Nothing in the life of man plays a greater rôle than these
imperatives. The danger that threatens Kant’s demonstration is due
to the number of rival categoricals that compete with his, and from
which the one he sets up is not with certainty distinguishable. To put
the matter simply, what is called in technical language a categorical
imperative is nothing else than a way of acting somehow felt by the
individual to be obligatory upon him, whether he likes it or dislikes
it. It is a constraint in which he is bound to acquiesce, a public rule
of some sort which overrides his private propensities.
Constraints of this sort are numerous. Many of them no one would think
of designating as moral. Some are distinctly antimoral. I will mention
a few:—for instance, the rules of behavior derived from the _tabu_
notion. Certain kinds of food may not be eaten; certain objects like
the Ark of the Covenant in David’s time may not be touched.[19] Strict
_tabus_ obtain in regard to marriage such as the rules of endogamy and
exogamy. Certain persons may not even be looked at. A feeling of horror
is felt toward those who transgress these rules; and the transgression
of them is often considered far more reprehensible than a moral sin.
It would evidently be absurd to characterize a Hottentot or a Fiji
Islander as the moral equal of a civilized man on the ground that, like
the latter, he possesses the sense of duty, consisting in his case
of an unquestioning acknowledgment of the categorical imperative of
_tabus_.
Gang loyalty is another instance in point. In one of our prisons a
certain convict is at present paying the penalty of a crime which was
really committed by one of his pals. He could have got off scot free
if he had “squealed.” But “squealing” is contrary to the honor code of
the gang and he preferred to sacrifice his liberty rather than prove
recreant to the claims of gang loyalty. There are some writers who hold
that this is an instance of morality, genuine as far as it goes, but
restricted within too narrow a circle. The fact that it is restricted
within too narrow a circle, that fidelity to a few is compatible with
violent hostility against the community at large, seems to me to
prove that the moral quality is absent. Morality is either universal
or nothing. Gang loyalty is a social phenomenon, but not an ethical
phenomenon. The distinction between the two terms will be enforced
later on. In any event the sense of constraint is manifest. The moral
character of the constraint I deny.
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