An ethical philosophy of life presented in its main outlinesAdler, Felix
Religion
An ethical philosophy of life presented in its main outlines
Adler, Felix
Ethics; Philosophy, Modern
Another example of an imperative which is categorical enough but
at the same time non-ethical is furnished by Darwin’s well-known
explanation of the original of conscience. He assumes that certain
ways of behaving which our ancestors found to be socially useful, have
become registered as it were in our organisms, and constitute a kind
of race-consciousness which persists in each individual. This latent
consciousness is potent as a tendency, though often not masterful
enough to repress the recalcitrant egoistic impulses. A conflict
ensues. The deep ingrained tendency makes itself felt. And as social
beings we are aware that we ought to side with it. But the egoistic
impulses break out on the surface of consciousness and vehemently
urge us in the opposite direction. The feeling of obligation, and
thereafter of remorse, are the record of the inner struggle. I do not
here undertake to discuss at length the truth of Darwin’s theory.
There are a number of weak spots in it, to which I shall merely allude
in passing. First, he speaks of acts found to be socially useful in
primitive communities. Is it possible to show that the same or similar
acts retain their utility in a developed industrial society like that
of the present day? Is not the term “socially useful” extremely vague,
and can the notion implied in it be expanded without the assistance
of a truly ethical principle?[20] Then again, why should the thing
called social utility overawe the individual mind and thwart individual
purpose? Why should not the daring egotist affirm his right to be and
flourish in the present hour, in the teeth of social utility? It will
be said that the claims are insistent, that the tendency is ingrained,
that it has become instinctive in him, and that he cannot release
himself from the control it exercises over him. But instincts can be
weakened and in time extinguished, like the fear of the dark, when
the absence of an objective cause is recognized. Why should not the
altruistic impulse likewise, by the method of Freudian analysis, if you
please, be exposed to the light, and the egotist thereby be enabled to
disembarrass himself of the interference of dead ancestors in his life
purposes, and to proceed on his way undisturbed by any inward qualms?
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