IT was not the design of Edwards, as it is well known, to interfere with the moral agency of man. He honestly believed that the scheme of necessity, as held by himself, was perfectly consistent with the doctrine of liberty; and he retorted upon his adversaries that it was their system, and not his, which struck at the foundation of moral agency and accountability. But however upright may have been his intentions, he has merely left us the name of liberty, while he has in reality denied to us its nature and its essence. According to his view of the subject, "The plain and obvious meaning of the words freedom and liberty, in common speech, is the _power, opportunity_, or _advantage that any one has to do as he pleases_. Or, in other words, his being free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any respect as he wills. And the contrary to liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a person's being hindered, or unable to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise." This is the kind of liberty for which he contends. And he says, "There are two things contrary to what is called liberty in common speech. One is _constraint_, otherwise called _force_, _compulsion_, and _co-action_, which is a person's being necessitated to do a thing _contrary_ to his will. The other is _restraint_; which is his being hindered, and not having power to do _according_ to his will. But that which has no will cannot be the subject of these things." This notion of liberty, as Edwards says, presupposes the existence of a will. In fact, it presupposes more than this; it presupposes the existence of a determination of the will. For, unless one is determined not to do a thing, he cannot be constrained to do it, contrary to his will; and, unless he is determined to do a thing, he cannot be restrained from doing it according to his will. This kind of liberty, then, as it presupposes the existence of a determination of the will, has nothing to do with the manner in which that determination is brought to pass. If the determination of the mind or will were brought to pass, so to speak, by an absolutely irresistible force; just as any other effect is brought to pass by its efficient cause; yet this kind of liberty might exist in its utmost perfection. For it only requires that after the will is determined in this manner, or in any other, that it should be left free from _constraint_ or _restraint_, to flow on just as it has been determined to do. It is no other liberty than that which is possessed by a current of water, when it is said to flow _freely_, because it is not opposed in its course by any material obstruction.