An Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom of the WillBledsoe, Albert Taylor
Philosophy
An Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will
Bledsoe, Albert Taylor
Edwards, Jonathan, 1703-1758. Freedom of the will; Free will and determinism
I have said, that we are not conscious that there is no producing cause
of volition. No man can be conscious of that which does not exist.
Hence, it is highly absurd to require us to furnish the evidence of
consciousness that there is no such cause of volition. It cannot testify
to any such universal negative; and one might as well require a
mathematical demonstration of the point in dispute, as to demand such
evidence from us. And yet, President Edwards declares, that by
experience he knows nothing like the doctrine, that "any volition arises
in his mind contingently;" that is to say, he was not conscious that a
volition has _no producing_ cause of its existence. Did he expect that
we should prove the non-existence of a thing by the direct evidence of
consciousness? All that he could reasonably expect in such a case is,
that we should not be conscious of any such influence; and this
President Edwards himself admits. He admits, that we do not see the
"effectual power of any cause," or feel its influence, operating to
produce a volition: he merely infers this from the assumption that
volition is a produced effect.
He also says, I find "that the acts of my will are my own; i. e. that
they are acts of my will--the volitions of my own mind; or, in other
words, that what I will, I will; which, I suppose, is the sum of what
others experience in this affair." Surely, no one was ever so silly as
to deny that what a man wills, he wills; and if this is all that
consciousness teaches on the subject, its information can throw no light
upon this or upon any other controversy. This proposition, that a man
wills what he wills, is independent of all experience and all
consciousness. It is an identical proposition, which experience can
neither shake nor confirm. We may see, nay, we must see, that each and
every thing in the universe is what it is, without any reference to
consciousness or experience.
Indeed, it is as absurd to appeal to experience or consciousness for the
truth of such a universal and self-evident axiom, as it is to appeal to
universal and self-evident axioms, to ascertain and determine the
_nature_ of our mental phenomena,--of the states and processes of the
mind. Edwards has done both: he has deduced the truth of the
proposition, that a man wills what he wills, from the evidence of
consciousness or experience, as the sum of all its teaching; and he has
established the fact, that a volition is produced by the operation of an
effectual power, by an appeal to a universal axiom. He has submitted a
truism, which declines every test of its truth, to the tribunal of
consciousness; and he has determined the nature of a volition, as well
as the manner of its production, by the application of a similar truism,
which contains no conceivable information respecting the nature of any
thing in the universe.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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