Thus, says he, "I observed before, in explaining the nature of necessity, that in things which are past, their past existence is now _necessary;_ having already made sure of existence, _it is now impossible that it should be otherwise than true, that the thing has existed_," p. 114-15. Just so we may say in relation to things which now exist; for, having already made sure of existence, it is impossible it should be otherwise than true, that they do now exist; or, in other words, it is impossible they should not exist while they do exist. In like manner, if the future existence of any thing is foreknown, "it is impossible it should be otherwise than true," that it should exist, or come to pass: that is to say, if it will exist, it will be impossible for it not to exist at the time of its existence. Foreknowledge, I admit, infers this kind of necessity; but is this any thing to the purpose? The conclusion is the same, whether it be deduced from foreknowledge, or concomitant knowledge. Let us suppose, then, for the sake of clearness and convenience, that a thing is now known to exist. It follows from hence, by a _logical_ necessity, that it does exist; for it could not possibly be known to exist, unless it did exist. And, as it does exist, "it is impossible that it should be otherwise than true that it does exist;" or, in other words, it is impossible for it not to exist now, while it does exist. This is all there is in this part of the argument. And what does it amount to? It is a simple declaration of what no body ever denied--that if a thing exists, or is to exist, or has existed, it is impossible to conceive of it as not existing at the time of its existence. All this is perfectly true, without the least reference to the question, how it came to exist, or how it will come to exist? It is wholly irrelevant to the point at issue. It controverts no position, held by any sane man that now lives, or that ever has lived. In other words, if a thing is known to exist, certainly and infallibly, then it does exist; and if it does exist, then "it is impossible it should be otherwise than true" that it does exist; and hence its existence is said to be necessary with an _axiomatical_ necessity. But this does not prove that it is _necessarily produced_. For, supposing it to exist, its existence would be necessary in the above sense, even if it had no cause of its existence. The necessity here referred to, is a necessity _in the order of our ideas_, and not _in the course of events_. It arises from the impossibility of a thing's not existing at the time it does exist; and it has no reference whatever to the causation of any thing: it is a fundamental law of belief, and not a _causal_ necessity. These three things, an _axiomatical_, a _logical_, and a _causal_ necessity, are most strangely confounded in the argument of President Edwards.