The encroachments of separate bodies on the public, it is entirely in the power of the state to prevent. It is owing to weakness or carelessness, or ignorance, that governments admit of such encroachments, and they are easily to be prevented, partly, as has been shewn, by positive regulation, and partly by counteracting them, whenever they appear to be proceeding in a direction any way doubtful. When they do so, the conclusion may be, that they are working for themselves; and, in that case, they ought to be very minutely examined into; and, as all public bodies, and men belonging to a class that has a particular interest generally derive their means of trenching on the public from government, it may very easily controul their action, or counteract the effect. As lawyers have the administration of justice amongst themselves; as the executive part is in their hand, the law-makers should be particularly careful to make them amenable by law for bad conduct; it ought not to be left in the bosom of a court, to strike off, or keep on, an improper man. It is not right, on the one hand, that attorneys, or any set of men, should be subject to an arbitrary exertion of power; and it is equally unfair for them to be protected, by having those who are to judge between them and the public, always belonging to their own body. In defence of this, it is said, that attornies are servants of the court, and that the business of the court being to do justice, their correction cannot be in better hands. This is a tolerably ingenious assertion, if it were strictly true; but the court consists both of judge and jury; whereas, in this case, the judge assumes all the power; that is to say, when a case is to be determined relative to the conduct of a lawyer, a lawyer is to be the sole judge, and the jury, who represent the public, are to have their power set aside; thus, when their opinion is most wanted, it is not allowed to be given. Under such regulation, what real redress can be expected? As for the taxing costs by a master, it is [end of page #279] rarely that a client, from prudential motives, dares appeal; and, when he does, the remedy is frequently worse than the disease; and, even in this case a lawyer judges a lawyer. Without saying any thing against the judgments, it will be allowed, that in neither case is the principle of Magna Carta adhered to, of a man being judged by his peers; besides, in every other fraud there is punishment proportioned to the crime. In this case there is no punishment, unless the extortion is exorbitant, and then the punishment is too great. It ought to be proportioned to the offence, as in cases of usury, and then it would be effectual; but to let small misdemeanors go free and to punish great ones beyond measure is the way to elude punishment in all cases. A man ought to pay his bill; let the attorney take the money at his peril, and let there be a court to judge fairly, at little expense, and with promptitude, and punish the