An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy (Vol. 1 of 2): Being an essay on the science of domestic policy in free nations. In which are particularly considered population, agriculture, trade, industry, money, coin, interest, circulation, banks, exchange, public credit, and taxesSteuart, James, Sir
History
An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy (Vol. 1 of 2): Being an essay on the science of domestic policy in free nations. In which are particularly considered population, agriculture, trade, industry, money, coin, interest, circulation, banks, exchange, public credit, and taxes
Steuart, James, Sir
Economics
Let impositions be ever so high, provided they be proportional, general,
gradually augmented, and permanent, they may have indeed the effect of
stopping foreign trade, and of starving the idle, but they never will
ruin the industrious, as we shall have occasion to shew in treating of
taxation. Whereas, when they are arbitrary, falling unequally upon
individuals of the same condition, sudden, and frequently changing their
object, it is impossible for industry to stand its ground. Such a system
of oeconomy introduces an unequal competition among those of the same
class, it stops industrious people in the middle of their career,
discourages others from exposing to the eyes of the public _the ease of
their circumstances_, consequently encourages hoarding; this again
excites rapaciousness upon the side of the statesman, who sees himself
frustrated in his schemes of laying hold of private wealth.
From this a new set of inconveniencies follow. He turns his views upon
solid property. This inspires the landlords with _indignation_ against
_him_ who can load _them_ at will; and with _envy_ against the _monied
interest_, who can baffle his attempts. This class again is constantly
upon the catch to profit of the public distress for want of money. What
is the consequence of all this? It is, that the lowest classes of the
people, who ought by industry to enrich the state, find on one hand the
monied interest constantly amassing, in order to lend to the state,
instead of distributing among _them_, by seasonable loans, their
superfluous income, with a view to share the reasonable profits of their
ingenuity; and on the other hand, they find the emissaries of taxation
robbing them of the seed before it is sown, instead of waiting for a
share in the harvest.
Under the feudal form of government, liberty and independence were
confined to the nobility. Birth opened the door of preferment to some,
and birth as effectually shut it against others. I have often observed
how, by reason and from experience, such a form of government must be
unfavourable both to trade and industry.
From reason it is plain, that industry must give wealth, and wealth
_will_ give power, if he who possesses it be left the master to employ
it as he pleases. A government could not therefore encourage a system
which tended to throw power into the hands of those who were only made
to obey. It was consequently very natural for the nobility to be jealous
of wealthy merchants, and of every one who became easy and independent
by means of their own industry; experience proved how exactly this
principle regulated their administration.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account