The plan of modern taxation seems first to have been introduced into cities, while the country was subject to the barons, and remained in a manner quite free from them. Cities having obtained the privilege of incorporation, began, in consequence of the power vested in their magistrates, to levy taxes: and finding the inconveniences resulting from external competition (foreign trade) they erected the different classes of their industrious into confraternities, or corporations of a lower denomination, with power to prevent the importation of work from their fellow tradesmen not of the society. Here arises a question. Why are corporations complained of in many countries, as being a check upon industry; if the establishment of them proceeds from so plain a principle as that here laid down? Let me draw my answer from another question. Why are they not complained of in all countries? The difference between the situation of one country and another, will plainly point out the principle which ought to regulate the establishment and government of corporations. When this is well understood, all disputes concerning the general utility, or harm arising from them will be at an end: and the question will be brought to the proper issue; to wit, their relative utility considered with respect to the actual situation of the country where they are established. In one province a corporation will be found useful, in another just the contrary. First then it must be agreed, on all hands, that the principle laid down is just. No body ever advanced, that the industry carried on in _towns_, where living is dear, ought to suffer a competition with that of the _country_, where living is cheap; I mean for the direct consumption of the citizens. But it may be advanced, that no subaltern corporation should enjoy an exclusive privilege against those who share of every burthen imposed by the great corporation from which they draw their existence. That they have no right of exclusion against citizens; but only against strangers who are not under the same jurisdiction, nor liable to the same burthens. Here the dispute lies between the members of the great corporation and those of the smaller. Now, I say, while no other interest is concerned, the decision of this question ought to be left to the corporation itself. But the moment the public good comes to be affected by certain privileges enjoyed by individuals, such privileges should either be abolished, or put under limitations.