Which of the two has most reason to complain, the bank, because the inhabitants think fit to send their effects out of the country, being either forced so to do by their creditors, or choosing so to do for their private advantage; or the creditors of the bank, and the country in general, when, from the obstructions the bank throws in the way, when required to pay its notes, exchange is forced up to an exorbitant height; the value of what private merchants owe to strangers is raised; and when, by discouraging trade in their hands, a general stop is put to manufactures and credit in general? In a word, the bank has no reason to complain, unless they can make it appear, how any person, exchanger or other, can find an advantage in sending coin out of the country, at a time when there is no demand for it; or when there is no near prospect of it, which is the same thing? To say that a principle of public spirit should prevent a person from doing with his property what is most to his advantage, in favour of saving some money to a bank, is supposing the bank to be the public, instead of being the servant of the public. Another argument to prove that no profit can be made by sending out coin, except when the balance is against a country, is, that we see all runs upon banks stop, the moment exchange becomes favourable. Were there a profit to be made upon sending off coin, independently of the debts to be paid with it, which cannot be paid without it, the same trade would be profitable at all times. As this is not the case, it follows, that the principle we have laid down is just; to wit, that the balance due to foreigners _must_ be paid by banks, while they have a note in circulation; and when once it is fairly paid by them, all extraordinary demands _must_ cease. We now proceed to another point, to wit, What are the consequences to circulation, when a great balance draws away a large quantity of coin from the bank, and sends it out of the country? ------------------------------------------------------------------------ CHAP. XII. _How the Payment of a wrong Balance affects Circulation._ That I may communicate my ideas with the greater precision, I must here enter into a short detail of some principles, and then reason on a supposition. It has been said, that the consequence of credit and paper-money, secured on solid property, was to augment the mass of the circulating equivalent, in proportion to the uses found for it. These uses may be comprehended under two general heads. The first, payment of what one owes; the second, buying what one has occasion for: the one and the other may be called by the general term of ready-money demands. Whoever has a ready-money demand upon him, and property at the same time, ought to be furnished with money by banks which lend upon mortgage.