Now, from what has been said, we may determine, that there should at all times remain in the country, or in the bank, a quantity of coin equal to (B); and if this be ever found to fall short, the bank does not discharge its duty. It is unnecessary to determine what part of (B) should be locked up in the bank, and what part should remain in circulation: banks themselves cannot determine that question: all we need to say is, that it is the profit of banks to accustom people to the use of paper as much as possible; and therefore they will draw to themselves as much coin as they can. When a favourable balance of trade brings exchange below par, and brings coin into the country, the consequence is, either to animate trade and industry, to augment the mass of payments, to swell (A), and still to preserve (C) in circulation; or to make (A) regorge, so as to sink the interest of money below the bank lending price; and then people will carry back the regorging part of (C) to the bank, and withdraw their securities; which is consolidating, as we have called it, the property which had been formerly melted down, for want of this circulating equivalent (money). This is constantly the consequence of a stagnation of paper, from an overcharge of it, thrown into circulation. It returns upon the bank, and diminishes the mass of their securities, but never that of their coin. From this we may conclude, that the circulation of a country can only absorb a determinate quantity of money (coin and paper); and that the less use they make of coin, the more use they will make of paper, and _vice versa_. We may also conclude, that when trade and alienation increase, _cæteris paribus_, so will money; that is, more solid property will be melted down; and when trade and alienation diminish, _cæteris paribus_, so will money; that is, some of the solid property formerly melted down, will consolidate, as we have called it.