An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy (Vol. 2 of 2): Being an essay on the science of domestic policy in free nations. In which are particularly considered population, agriculture, trade, industry, money, coin, interest, circulation, banks, exchange, public credit, and taxesSteuart, James, Sir
General
An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy (Vol. 2 of 2): Being an essay on the science of domestic policy in free nations. In which are particularly considered population, agriculture, trade, industry, money, coin, interest, circulation, banks, exchange, public credit, and taxes
Steuart, James, Sir
Economics
According to principles, these two operations should go hand in hand:
the recalling the credits would, no doubt, have greatly distressed
exchangers; but as long as they could find money to borrow from private
hands, that inconvenience would have been lessened. Besides, I apprehend
that the late custom among exchangers, of borrowing at 4 _per cent._
owes its existence to the difficulty they felt in obtaining extensive
credits from the bank; and if this be the case, then there has been a
_lucrum cessans_ to the bank of 5 _per cent._ upon the amount of all
these borrowings; because exchangers, I apprehend, would prefer a credit
from the bank at 5 _per cent._ to a loan at 4 _per cent._ payable on
demand, according to the occasions of those who keep their money with
them.
The most effectual method, therefore, to hurt exchangers, would have
been to have recalled all their credits, and offered to borrow, upon the
same terms, what was lent to them.
The execution of such a plan would, I think, have been, 1. diametrically
opposite to the interest of the banks; 2. would have occasioned such a
run upon exchangers, as to throw them into great distress; and 3. would
have ended in the total ruin of the trade of Scotland.
That such a plan is diametrically opposite to all principles of banking,
I suppose, is by this time sufficiently understood.
That it would have occasioned a run upon exchangers, is pretty certain:
because however good their credit might be, it must be acknowledged to
be inferior to that of the banks; and therefore no body would prefer
them for debtors, to the bank, upon the same terms.
The third consequence is as evident, upon a short reflection, as the
other two. The run upon the exchangers would have obliged them to make a
call upon all the merchants and dealers in Scotland, to whom they gave
credit: for which purpose, and for which alone, they find an interest in
borrowing at so high an interest as 4 _per cent._
The call, then, made by the exchangers upon their debtors, is neither
more or less than a call upon the money employed in the trade of
Scotland.
Now we have said, that whoever owes _must pay_. The merchants of
Scotland owe to exchangers; the latter are pressed by their creditors,
and _must pay_ with what they have, which consists in money only: when
that is exhausted, they must shut up shop. _They_ again call upon the
merchants, who _must pay_ with what they have. This consists in goods,
and in the manufactures of Scotland; and these they _must_ sell at any
price. There may not be time sufficient to export with advantage. To
whom then must they sell? To people within the country, who have no
money to buy with; because credit is withheld by that body which only
can give it. I conclude with the old saying of the law,
_Unum quodque eodem modo solvitur quo colligatum est._
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