"The 1300 millions of coin _which were in France_, were very far from 2696 millions of notes. In that case, the sum of notes was to the sum of coin, nearly as 22⁄27 are to 1; that is to say, that 207 livres 8 sols 1⅞ denier in notes, was only worth 100 livres in coin; or otherwise, that a bank note of 100 livres, was only worth 48 livres 4 sols 5 deniers in coin, or thereabouts." Would not any mortal conclude from this, that the whole sum of 1300 millions had been in the bank, as the only fund for the payment of the paper? This is a laboured equation, and from it we have a specimen of this gentleman’s method of calculating the value of bank paper: but let us hear him out. “This prodigious quantity of money in circulation, says he, had raised the price of every thing excessively: so in order to bring down prices, it was judged more expedient to diminish the denomination of the bank notes, than to raise the denomination of the coin; because _that_ diminished the quantity of money, _this_ augmented it.” This was the grand point put under deliberation, before the famous _arret_ of the 21st of May was given, viz. whether to raise the value of the coin, _which did not belong to the bank, but to the French nation_, to double the denomination it bore at that time, that is, to 130 livres the marc, by which means the 1300 millions would have made 2600 millions, or to reduce the 2600 millions of bank notes to one half, that is, to 1300 millions, the total denomination of the coin. To some people it would have appeared more proper, to allow matters to stand as they were, as long as they would stand, at least until the actions had been all sold off; but this was not thought proper. After a most learned deliberation, it was concluded to reduce the denomination of all the paper of France, bank notes as well as actions, instead of raising the denomination of the coin; and this because prices were in proportion to the quantity of the denominations of money. The _arret_ was no sooner published than the whole paper fabric fell to nothing. The day following, the 22d of May, a man might have starved with a hundred millions of paper in his pocket. This was a catastrophe the like of which, I believe, never happened: it is so ridiculous that it is a subject fit only for a farce. Here Dutot’s lamentations and regrets are inimitable. In one place he says, “Credit was too far stretched to be solid. It was therefore proper to sacrifice one part, to give a solidity to the other. Even this was done; but the consequences did not correspond to the intention. Confidence, which is the soul of credit, eclipsed itself, and the loss of the bank note, drew on the loss of the action.” In another place he says, “This _arret_ of the 21st of May, which according to some _blessoit l’equité_” (a very mild expression!) “destroyed all confidence in the public; because the King had diminished one half of that paper money (the bank notes) which had been declared fixed.”