This augmentation, therefore, upon the value of all capitals, during the Missisippi, of lands as well as actions, was in consequence of the fall of interest, and from no other artifice whatever. Lands in France, at that time, sold at 80 and 100 years purchase. [Dutot, Vol. II. p. 200.] When credit failed, and when all the circulating paper was thrown into a state of stagnation, interest rose, in proportion to the deficiency of the supply for the demands of borrowers. The value of capitals then diminished. But this might have happened from another cause, had there been no bankruptcy, or intention to defraud the creditors: a war might have produced it; or any circumstance which might have raised the rate of interest. The rise, therefore, upon capitals, from the fall of interest, I consider here as no acquisition of wealth: I reckon wealth to be that which is the annual produce of the capitals. So much for the resolution of this wonderful phænomenon. I must now shew that in the height of the distress, the confidence of the public was still to be regained, and credit recovered, even after the fatal _arret_ of the 21st of May 1720. I lay it down as a principle, _that whoever has a sufficient fund, and pays interest regularly for the money he owes, runs no risk of losing his credit_. So soon, therefore, as the Regent found that by his _arret_ of the 21st of May, all credit had disappeared; had he, upon the 27th of the same month, or at the time he raised the coin to 82 livres 10 sols _per_ marc, ordered all bank notes presented to the bank, either to be paid in coin, or marked in the books of the bank as bearing interest at 2 _per cent._ I say, credit would not have suffered in any comparison to what it did. No body then would have sold a note at discount; and had it been necessary, he might have ordered the interest to be paid monthly. The authority I have for this opinion is Dutot, who says, that upon opening the subscription of 25 millions in the month of June, the notes fell in their value 11½ _per cent._ only. Now the rate of this subscription was at 2½ _per cent._ as we have seen; consequently, if 100 livres of notes lost but 11½ _per cent._ they were worth 88½ livres in coin; but these 100 livres in notes were worth 2½ _per cent._ because the subscription was open at that rate: consequently 88½ livres in coin was also worth 2 livres 10 sols _per annum_: consequently interest, at that time, was at 2.825 _per cent._ that is, below 3 _per cent._ even after the bankruptcy. Where then was the great harm? Where was the occasion to fly immediately to the destruction of actions, which were in the Regent’s own hand? A little patience, and good management, would have set all to rights.