These are all facts mentioned by Dutot, and yet he never will ascribe the rise of exchange in France to any other cause than to the tampering with the denominations of their coin: an operation which may rob one set of people in favour of another; but which has very little effect upon exchange, when other circumstances do not concur, as in the case before us. Now had the high exchange against France been owing to a wrong balance upon her trade, is it not evident that the Cardinal’s operation would have succeeded, that all demands for bills at Samuel Bernard’s office would have been confined to the exact extent of that balance; that the reciprocal debts would have been negotiated between the merchants at par; and, consequently, that all expence upon exchange would have been saved to individuals, at the small charge to government of transporting the balance paid for the bills by the merchants at Paris? Were prosperous trading states, therefore, conducted by statesmen, intelligent, capable, and uninfluenced by motives of private interest, they would make it a rule to be at the expence of sending off, and bringing home all balances, without the charge of exchange to traders: but the consequence of either neglect, or incapacity in the man at the helm, would then become so fatal that it might be dangerous to attempt, at once, so great a change in the present method of paying balances: but I never make allowances for the defects of a statesman, while I am deducing the principles which ought to direct his conduct. I shall next slightly point out the bad consequences which, _upon an unfavourable state of commerce_, might result from such a plan; and without recommending any thing to practice, leave the reader to judge of the expediency. We see, that by a statesman’s giving bills at par, _on all occasions_, and being himself at the expence of transportation and insurance, in bringing home and sending off all balances, exchange would of itself come to par. The first consequence of this would be, the total annihilation of the exchange business; and if, after that, any interruption should happen by neglect in the statesman, trade might suffer considerably. Another consequence is, that the most destructive trade would go forward without a check, as long as merchants could pay the par of the bills they demanded upon foreign parts: and this they would constantly be enabled to do, while there was either coin or paper in circulation, as has been explained in treating of banks of circulation upon mortgage. The consequence of this would be, to oblige the state to pledge the revenue of the country to strangers, in proportion to the balance owing, over and above the extent of the metals to discharge it.