We have now applied the principles formerly laid down, towards discovering the most proper expedients for removing or palliating the three inconveniences to be struggled with in regulating exchange. 1. How to estimate the value of a balance due: 2. How to pay it with the coin or bullion of the country: and lastly, How to prevent the price of exchange from affecting any thing more than the balance to be paid, after all reciprocal debts have been compensated. It remains to inquire, what are the most proper methods to acquit what a nation may owe, after it has done all it can to pay the value of their balance in the other way. At first sight, it must appear evident that the only method here is to give security, and pay interest for what cannot be paid in any other value. This is constantly done by every nation; but as the ordinary methods are very perplexed, and are attended with expences which raise exchange to a great height, and thereby prove a prodigious discouragement to trade in general: it would be no small advantage, could all this loss on exchange be equally thrown upon every class within the state, instead of being thrown entirely upon its commerce. As this is the expedient to be proposed, it will not be amiss to observe, that foreign balances arise chiefly upon four articles. 1. The great importation and consumption of foreign productions. 2. The payment of debts and interest due to foreigners. 3. The lending money to other nations. And 4. the great expence of the state, or of individuals, abroad. Could all the bad consequences arising from these four causes, and the high exchange occasioned by them, be cast upon that interest alone which occasions them, I would not propose to lay the whole body of the nation under contribution for repairing the loss. But if from the nature of the thing, as matters stand, the whole be found to fall upon trade, without a possibility of preventing it, in this case, I think, it is better for the nation, _in cumulo_, to lend its assistance, and share the burdens, than to allow it to fall upon that part of the body politic from which the whole draws its vigour and prosperity. It cannot be denied, that when a heavy balance is due by a nation, it has the effect of raising exchange upon every draught or remittance. When bills are demanded to pay a foreign claim, it cannot be determined from what cause the claim has arisen. Whether for national purposes or not, the exchange is the same, and equally affects the whole interest of trade. If this be a fair state of the case, I think we may determine, that such balances are to be paid by the assistance and intervention of a statesman’s administration.