Such a philosophy does not seem to do violence to the common experience of minds and of physical things shared by us all, whether we are philosophers or are not. It only tries to make clear what we all know dimly and vaguely. This is, I think, a point in its favor. However, men of great ability and of much learning have inclined to doctrines very different; and we have no right to make up our minds on such a subject as this without trying to give them an attentive and an impartial hearing. 59. SINGULARISM AND PLURALISM.--There are those who apply to the various forms of monism the title _Singularism_, and who contrast with this _Pluralism_, a word which is meant to cover the various doctrines which maintain that there is more than one ultimate principle or being in the universe. It is argued that we should have some word under which we may bring such a doctrine, for example, as that of the Greek philosopher Empedocles (born about 490 B.C.). This thinker made earth, water, fire, and air the four material principles or "roots" of things. He was not a monist, and we can certainly not call him a dualist. Again. The term pluralism has been used to indicate the doctrine that individual finite minds are not parts or manifestations of one all-embracing Mind,--of God or the Absolute,--but are relatively independent beings. This doctrine has been urged in our own time, with eloquence and feeling, by Professor Howison.[2] Here we have a pluralism which is idealistic, for it admits in the universe but one _kind_ of thing, minds; and yet refuses to call itself monistic. It will readily be seen that in this paragraph and in the one preceding the word is used in different senses. I have added the above sentences to this chapter that the reader may have an explanation of the meaning of a word sometimes met with. But the title of the chapter is "Monism and Dualism," and it is of this contrast that it is especially important to grasp the significance. [1] "Outlines of Psychology," pp. 64-65, English translation, 1891. [2] "The Limits of Evolution, and Other Essays," revised edition. New York, 1905. CHAPTER XV RATIONALISM, EMPIRICISM, CRITICISM, AND CRITICAL EMPIRICISM 60. RATIONALISM.--As the content of a philosophical doctrine must be determined by the _initial assumptions_ which a philosopher makes and by the _method_ which he adopts in his reasonings, it is well to examine with some care certain broad differences in this respect which characterize different philosophers, and which help to explain how it is that the results of their reflections are so startlingly different.