An Introduction to PhilosophyFullerton, George Stuart
Philosophy
An Introduction to Philosophy
Fullerton, George Stuart
Philosophy
If we ask him: Does the man who wags his head move his mind about? does
he who mounts a step raise his mind some inches? does he who sits down
on a chair lower his mind? I think we shall find that he hesitates in
his answers. And if we go on to say: Could a line be so drawn as to
pass through your image of me and my image of you, and to measure their
distance from one another? I think he will say, No. He does not
regard minds and their ideas as existing in space in this fashion.
Furthermore, it would not strike the plain man as absurd if we said to
him: Were our senses far more acute than they are, it is conceivable
that we should be able to perceive every atom in a given human body,
and all its motions. But would he be willing to admit that an increase
in the sharpness of sense would reveal to us directly the mind
connected with such a body? It is not, then, in the body as the atoms
are. It cannot be seen or touched under any conceivable circumstances.
What can it mean, hence, to say that it is _there_? Evidently, the
word is used in a peculiar sense, and the plain man cannot help us to a
clear understanding of it.
His position becomes intelligible to us when we realize that he has
inherited the doctrine that the mind is immaterial, and that he
struggles, at the same time, with the tendency so natural to man to
conceive it after the analogy of things material. He thinks of it as
in the body, and, nevertheless, tries to dematerialize this "in." His
thought is sufficiently vague, and is inconsistent, as might be
expected.
If we will bear in mind what was said in the closing section of the
last chapter, we can help him over his difficulty. That mind and body
are related there can be no doubt. But should we use the word "in" to
express this relation?
The body is a certain group of phenomena in the objective order; that
is, it is a part of the external world. The mind consists of
experiences in the subjective order. We have seen that no mental
phenomenon can occupy space--real space, the space of the external
world--and that it cannot even have a position in space (section 34).
As mental, it is excluded from the objective order altogether. The
mind is not, then, strictly speaking, _in_ the body, although it is
related to it. It remains, of course, to ask ourselves how we ought to
conceive the relation. This we shall do later in the present chapter.
But, it may be said, it would sound odd to deny that the mind is in the
body. Does not every one use the expression? What can we substitute
for it? I answer: If it is convenient to use the expression let us
continue to do so. Men must talk so as to be understood. But let us
not perpetuate error, and, as occasion demands it, let us make clear to
ourselves and to others what we have a right to understand by this _in_
when we use it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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