Despite all its initial extravagances, the _bona fides_ of the Ebert-Haase government at this time cannot fairly be questioned. It honestly desired to restore order in Germany and to institute a democratic government. With the exception of Barth, the least able and least consequential member of the cabinet, all were agreed that a constituent assembly must be summoned. Haase and Dittmann, the two other Independent Socialist members, had not yet begun to coquet with the idea of soviet government, although, in the matter of a constituent assembly, they were already trying to hunt with the hounds and run with the hares by favoring its summoning, but demanding that the elections therefor be postponed until the people could be "enlightened in the Social-Democratic sense." This meant, of course, "in the Independent Social-Democratic sense," which, as we shall see, eventually degenerated into open advocacy of the domination of the proletariat. To this government, facing multifold tasks, inexperienced in ruling, existing only on sufferance and at best a makeshift and compromise, the armistice of November 11th dealt a terrible moral and material blow. A wave of stupefied indignation and resentment followed the publication of its terms, and this feeling was increased by the general realization of Germany's helplessness. Hard terms had, indeed, been expected, but nothing like these. One of the chief factors that made bloodless revolution possible had been the reliance of the great mass of the German people on the declarations of leaders of enemy powers--particularly of the United States--that the war was being waged against the German governmental system, the Hohenzollerns and militarism, and not against the people themselves. There can be no doubt that these promises of fair treatment for a democratic Germany did incalculably much to paralyze opposition to the revolution.