Behind this question of Poland there loomed, however, another question much more important and far-reaching for European equilibrium. Napoleon had as yet not uttered the famous words, that before fifty years Europe would be French or Cossack. But already many far-seeing minds had become alarmed, and not without reason, at seeing Russia assuming the mastership on the Vistula. With the object of ‘forcing her back towards her inhospitable climate,’ and of plucking Poland from her domination, Austria, France, and England made a secret treaty on the 10th of January 1815. Talleyrand’s influence had determined that compact, for he already inclined towards an English alliance, to the realisation of which he looked so hard fifteen years later. That self-same treaty which the ministers of Louis XVIII. left behind them at the time of their flight on the 26th March 1815, and which Napoleon promptly sent to Alexander, was the cause of Alexander’s resentment against Talleyrand, which was never overcome. It was one of the causes which, after the second Restoration, kept the French diplomatist away from the ministry and from public affairs. Nevertheless, it was supposed that the Grand-Duke Constantine, who had left Vienna in deference to his brother and master’s will, was only occupied with reviews and manœuvres, the supposedly exclusive objects of his passion. Nobody thought of war, and everybody ardently desired peace. Suddenly there came to Vienna a proclamation addressed by the Grand-duke to the Polish nation, which was tantamount to an appeal to arms. This strange manifesto was composed as follows:--