We often say, for example, that _interest_ guides behaviour in this
direction or in that. But such interest must not be regarded as an
impelling force; it is an attribute of the conscious situation, more or
less suffused with feeling-tone. It is not easy to define; but it seems
to take on its distinctive character when re-presentative elements
contribute what Dr. Stout[121] terms “meaning” to the conscious
situation. The meaning in the early stages of mental development is,
however, merely perceptual, and not that which comes much later--that
which is implied in the phrase “rational significance.” In the chick
which has tasted a cinnabar caterpillar the situation evoked by the
sight of this larva has meaning in virtue of the actual experience.
But, in this case, the meaning is not conducive to continued interest,
since it checks, rather than stimulates, behaviour. At first, indeed,
there may be the repellent interest of aversion. But this passes by,
and the larvæ are soon ignored. Small worms also acquire meaning, and
here the interest is attractive, and is stimulated afresh each time
the meaning is reinforced by repetition of the act of seizing and
swallowing.
We have seen that it is through behaviour that things become
differentiated from their surroundings, and acquire relative
independence in experience. It is through behaviour that what we have
termed conscious situations develop. The thing is the centre or nucleus
of a developing situation--that which starts the behaviour, and towards
which the behaviour is directed; or, since the behaviour may be that
of avoidance or escape, we should, perhaps, rather say, it is that to
which the behaviour has reference. Now, if interest is the feeling-tone
attaching to the whole attentive situation, and if the nucleus of the
situation is the thing, it naturally follows that the thing becomes
the centre of interest. The mouse is a centre of absorbing interest to
the cat, her eggs to the mother-bird, his mate to the sparrow in the
spring. Companions are centres of abiding interest to social animals,
because they are also the centres of social behaviour and the conscious
situations arising thereout; because they evoke in special ways the
attentive situation.
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