| | | F 10.00 App. QQ (a) (bar chute) |Jan. 7, 1901 | | F 10.00 Box Zeta (new side plug) |Jan. 8, 1901 | .50 | | | | App. QQ (b) (2½ revolution | | | chute) |Jan. 8, 1901 | | F 10.00 App. QQ (c) (nail-plug | | | chute) |Jan. 11, 1901| | F 5.00 | | | F 5.00 Box Epsilon (push down) |Jan. 12, 1901| | F 10.00 | | | App. QQ (d) (ring chute) |Jan. 16, 1901| im. | | | | App. QQ (e) (hook chute) |Jan. 16, 1901| | F 5.00 App. QQ (f) (string chute) | | | App. QQ (ff) (string-wire |Jan. 19, 1901| | F 5.00 chute) | | | F 5.00 -------------------------------+-------------+---------+---------- The methods one has to take to get them to do anything, their general conduct in becoming tame and in the experiments throughout, confirm these conclusions. The following particular phenomena are samples of the many which are inconsistent with the presence of reasoning as a general function. No. 1 had learned to open a door by pushing a bar around from a horizontal to a vertical position. The same box was then fitted with two bars. He turned the first bar round thirteen times before attempting to push the other bar around. In box LL all three monkeys would in the early trials do one or two of the acts over and over after they had once done them. No. 1, who had learned to pull a loop of wire off from a nail, failed thereafter to pull off a similar loop made of string. No. 1 and No. 3 had learned to poke their left hands through the cage for me to take and operate a chute with. It was extremely difficult to get either of them to put his right hand through or even to let me take it and pull it through. A negative answer to the question “Do the monkeys reason?” thus seems inevitable, but I do not attach to the question an importance commensurate with the part it has played historically in animal psychology. For I think it can be shown, and I hope in a later monograph to show, that reasoning is probably but one secondary result of the general function of having free ideas in great numbers, one product of a type of brain which works in great detail, not in gross associations. The denial of reasoning need not mean, and does not to my mind, any denial of continuity between animal and human mentality or any denial that the monkeys are mentally nearer relatives to man than are the other mammals. So much for supererogatory explanation. Let us now turn to a more definite and fruitful treatment of these records.