Animal intelligence: Experimental studiesThorndike, Edward L. (Edward Lee)
Science
Animal intelligence: Experimental studies
Thorndike, Edward L. (Edward Lee)
Animal intelligence; Psychology, Comparative
Paramecium does not change its response to, say, an obstacle in the
water, from swimming backward, turning to one side and swimming forward
by abbreviating and eventually omitting the turn and the backward
movement. The schoolboy does not tend to count 1, 2, 10 or to say a, b,
z, or give ablative plurals after nominative singulars.
Repetition of a series of physiological states in and of itself on the
contrary makes an animal increasingly _more_ likely to _maintain_ the
series _in toto_. It is hard to give the first and then the last word of
an oft repeated passage like Hamlet’s soliloquy or the Lord’s Prayer, or
to make readily the first and then the last movement of writing a name or
address. Repetition never eliminates absolutely and eliminates relatively
the _less_ often or _less_ emphatically connected.
Even if supplemented by the law of effect, so that some force is at hand
to change the effect of S upon the animal to A D instead of the original
A B C D, the law of the resolution of physiological states would be
relevant to only a fraction of learning. For example, let a cat or dog be
given an ordinary discrimination experiment, but so modified that whether
the animal responds by the ‘right’ or the ‘wrong’ act _he is removed
immediately after the reward or punishment_. That is, the event is either
S R1 or S R2, never S R1 R2. Let the experiment be repeated at intervals
so long that the physiological state, St. R1, or St. R2, leading to the
response R1 or R2 in the last trial, has ceased before the next. The
animal will come to respond to S by R2 only, though R2 has never been
reached by the ‘resolution’ of S R1 R2.
Cats in jumping for birds or mice, men in playing billiards, tennis or
golf, and many other animals in many other kinds of behavior, often learn
as the dog must in this experiment. The situation on different occasions
is followed by different responses, but by only one per occasion.
Professor Jennings was misled by treating as general the special case
where the situation itself includes a condition of discomfort terminable
only by a ‘successful’ response or by the animal’s exhaustion or death.
Assuming as typical this same limited case of response to an annoying
situation, so that success consists simply in replacing the situation
by another, Stevenson Smith reduces the learning-process to the law of
exercise alone. He argues that,—
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account