Animal intelligence: Experimental studiesThorndike, Edward L. (Edward Lee)
Science
Animal intelligence: Experimental studies
Thorndike, Edward L. (Edward Lee)
Animal intelligence; Psychology, Comparative
We may now look for a moment at what previous writers have said about the
nature of association in animals. The complaint was made early in this
book that all the statements had been exceedingly vague and of no value,
except as retorts to the ‘reason’ school. In the course of the discussion
I have tried to extricate from this vagueness definite statements about
imitation, association of ideas, association by ideas. There is one more
theory, more or less hidden in the vagueness,—the theory that association
in animals is the same as association in man, that the animal mind
differs from the human mind only by the absence of reason and what it
implies. Presumably, silence about what association is, means that it is
the association which human psychology discusses. When the silence is
broken, we get such utterances of this theory as the following:—
“I think we may say then that the higher animals are able to proceed a
long way in the formation and definition of highly complex constructs,
analogous to but probably differing somewhat from those which we form
ourselves. These constructs, moreover, through association with
reconstructs, or representations, link themselves in trains so that a
sensation, or group of sensations, may suggest a series of reconstructs,
or a series of remembered phenomena.” (C. L. Morgan, Animal Life and
Intelligence, p. 341.)
“Lastly, before taking leave of the subject of the chapter, I am
most anxious that it should not be thought that, in contending that
intelligence is not reason, I wish in any way to disparage intelligence.
Nine tenths at least of the actions of average men are intelligent and
not rational. Do we not all of us know hundreds of practical men who are
in the highest degree intelligent, but in whom the rational, analytic
faculty is but little developed? Is it any injustice to the brutes to
contend that their inferences are of the same order as those of these
excellent practical folk? In any case, no such injustice is intended;
and if I deny them self-consciousness and reason, I grant to the higher
animals perceptions of marvelous acuteness and intelligent inferences of
wonderful accuracy and precision—intelligent inferences in some cases,
no doubt, more perfect even than those of man, who is often disturbed by
many thoughts” (_ibid._, pp. 376-377).
“Language and the analytic faculty it renders possible differentiate man
from the brute” (_ibid._, p. 376).
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