The chief psychological interest of these data is that they show that permanence of associations _is not memory_. The fact that a cat, when after an interval she is put into box G, proceeds to immediately press the thumb piece and push the door, does not at all mean that the cat feels the box to be the same from which she weeks ago freed herself by pushing down that thumb piece, or thinks about ever having felt or done anything in that box. She does not refer the present situation to a situation of the past and realize that it is the same, but simply feels on being confronted with that situation the same impulse which she felt before. She does the thing now for just the same reason that she did it before, namely, because pleasure has connected that act above all others with that sense-impression, so that it is the one she feels like doing. Her condition is that of the swimmer who starts his summer season after a winter’s deprivation. When he jumps off the pier and hits the water, he swims, not because he remembers that this is the way he dealt with water last summer and so applies his remembrance to present use, but just because experience has taught him to feel like swimming when he hits the water. All talk about recognition and memory in animals, if it asserts the presence of anything more than this, is a gross mistake. For real memory is an absolute thing, including everything but forgetfulness. If the cat had real memory, it would, when after an interval dropped into a box, remember that from this box it escaped by doing this or that and consequently, either immediately or after a time of recollection, go do it, or else it would not remember and would fail utterly to do it. On the contrary, we have all grades of _partial_ ‘forgetfulness,’ just like the grades of swimming one might find if he dropped a dozen college professors into the mill ponds of their boyhood, just like the grades of forgetfulness of the associations once acquired on the ball field which are manifested when on the Fourth of July the ‘solid men’ of a town get out to amuse their fellow citizens. The animal makes attacks on a spot around the vital one, or claws at the thing—but not so precisely as before, or goes at it a while and then resorts to instinctive methods of getting out. Its actions are exactly what would be expected of an animal in whom the sense-impression aroused the impulse imperfectly, or weakly, or intermittently, but are not at all like the actions of one who felt, “I used to get out of this box by pulling that loop down.” In fact, the record of No. 10 given on page 139 seems to be final on this point. If at any time in the course of the 50 trials it had _remembered_ that ‘I will not feed them’ meant ‘no fish,’ it would thenceforth have failed to react. It would have stopped short in the ‘yes’ reactions, instead of gradually decreasing their percentage. ‘Memory’ in animals, if one still chooses to use the word, is _permanence of associations_, not the