Animal intelligence: Experimental studiesThorndike, Edward L. (Edward Lee)
Science
Animal intelligence: Experimental studies
Thorndike, Edward L. (Edward Lee)
Animal intelligence; Psychology, Comparative
It should first be noted about the _fact_ that the pleasure does not
burn in an impulse and act themselves, but an impulse and act _as
connected with that particular situation_. No cat ever goes around
clawing, clawing, clawing all the time, because clawing in these boxes
has resulted in pleasure. Secondly, the connection thus stamped in
is _not contemporaneous, but prior to_ the pleasure. So much for the
fact; now for the explanation. I do not wish to rehearse or add to the
arguments with which so many pages have been already filled by scientists
and philosophers both. What we need most is not argument, but accurate
accounts of the mental fact and of the brain-process. But I do wish to
say to the parallelist, what has not to my knowledge been said, that if
he presupposes, to account for this fact, a ‘physical analogue of the
hedonic consciousness,’ it is his bounden duty to first show how any
motion in any neurone or group of neurones in the nervous system can
possess this power of stamping in any current which causes it. For no one
would, from our present knowledge of the brain, judge _a priori_ that any
motion in any part of it could be conceived which should be thus regnant
over all the others. And next he must show the possibility of the current
which represents the association being the excitant of the regnant motion
in a manner direct enough for the purpose.
I wish also to say that whoever thinks that, going along with the current
which parallels the association, there is an accompanying minor current,
which parallels the pleasure and which stamps in the first current when
present with it, flies directly in the face of the facts. _There is no
pleasure along with the association. The pleasure does not come until
after the association is done and gone._ It is caused by no such minor
current, but by the excitation of peripheral sense-organs when freedom
from confinement is realized or food is secured. Of course, the notion of
such a secondary subcurrent is mythology, anyway.
To the interactionist I would say: “Do not any more repeat in tiresome
fashion that consciousness _does_ alter movement, but get to work and
show when, where, in what forms and to what degrees it does so. Then,
even if it turns out to have been a physical parallel that did the work,
you will, at least, have the credit of attaining the best knowledge about
the results and their conditions, even though you misnamed the factor.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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