With the development of language we state our inferences in the form of propositions, and call them judgments. "Every proposition," says Mr. Sully,[GA] "is made up of two principal parts: (1) the subject, or the name of that about which something is asserted; (2) the predicate, or the name of that which is asserted. Thus, when we affirm, 'This knife is blunt,' we affirm or predicate the fact of being blunt of a certain subject, namely, 'this knife.' Similarly, when we say, 'Air corrodes,' we assert or predicate the power of corroding of the subject 'air.'" The proposition always involves conceptual elements; for the predicate of a proposition is always an abstract idea or general notion. Propositions so formed may then become links in a chain of reasoning. "To reason is," says Mr. Sully,[GB] "to pass from a certain judgment or certain judgments to a new one." And so passing on from judgment to judgment, we may ascend to the higher levels of abstract thought. According to Mr. Sully's definition, therefore, we start from a judgment or judgments in the process of reasoning. The formation of a judgment (conceptual inference) is, however, the first step in a continuous process; and I propose, under this term, "reason,"[GC] to include this first step also. The formation of a conceptual inference I regard as the first stage of reason. Any mental process involving conceptual inference I shall call _rational_. In contradistinction to this, I shall use the term "intelligence" for the processes by which perceptual inferences are reached. An intelligent act is an act performed as the outcome of merely perceptual inference. A rational act is the outcome of an inference which contains a conceptual element. NOTES [FP] I use this term in a broad sense, as the process involved in the formation of what I shall term _constructs_.