In other words, A, the intelligent man, deals with phenomena as wholes, and his perceptual inferences are rapid and exact; while B, the reasoner, analyzes the phenomena, and draws conceptual inferences about them. Let us take next Dr. Rae's[GX] most interesting description of the cunning of Arctic foxes. These clever animals, he tells us, soon learn to avoid the ordinary steel and wooden traps. The Hudson Bay trappers, therefore, set gun-traps. The bait is laid on the snow, and connected with the trigger of the gun by a string fifteen or twenty feet long, five or six inches of slack being left to allow for contraction from moisture. The fox, on taking up the bait, discharges the gun and is shot. But, after one or more foxes have been shot, the cunning beasts often adopt one of two devices. Either they gnaw through the string, and then take the bait; or they tunnel in the snow at right angles to the line of fire, and pull the bait _downwards_, thus discharging the gun, but remaining uninjured. This is regarded by Dr. Rae as a wonderful instance of "abstract reasoning." Here, again, it is the "abstract reasoning" that I question. Do the clever foxes resemble the intelligent workman A, or the abstract reasoner B? I believe that their actions are the result of perceptual inferences. They adopt their cunning devices _after one or more foxes have been shot_. Their keen perceptions (let me repeat that the perceptions of wild animals are extraordinarily keen) lead them to see that this food, quiet as it seems, has to be taken with caution. With regard to the devices adopted, I think we need further information. Do Arctic foxes tunnel in the snow for any other purposes? What is the proportion of those who adopt this device to those who gnaw through the string? Have careful and reliable observers watched the foxes? or are their actions, as described by Dr. Rae, inferences, on the part of the trappers, from the state of matters they found when they came round to examine their traps? Without fuller information on these points, it is undesirable to discuss the case further. Even if we had full details, however, we should be as little able to get at the process of perceptual inference in the case of the fox as we are in the case of the intelligent workman, who sees the right thing to do, but cannot tell you how he reached the conclusion.