“The interest which the plaintiffs had in the life of Mr. Pitt was that of creditors, a description of interest which was held to be an insurable one. That interest depended on the life of Mr. Pitt in respect of the means and of the probability of payment which the continuance of his life afforded to such creditors, and the probability of loss which resulted from his death. The event against which the indemnity was sought by this assurance, was the consequence of his death as affecting the interest of these individuals assured in the loss of their debt. This action is, in point of law, founded upon a supposed damnification of the plaintiffs, occasioned by his death existing at the time of the action, and being so founded, it follows that if before the action was brought, the damage was obviated by the payment of his debt to them, the foundation of any action on their part on the ground of such assurance fails. And it is no objection to this answer that the fund out of which their debt was paid did not originally belong to the executors, as a part of the assets of the deceased; for though it was devised to them _aliunde_, the debt of the testator was equally satisfied by them thereout, and the damnification of the creditors, in respect of which their action upon the insurance contract is alone maintainable, was fully obviated before their action was brought. Upon this ground, therefore, that the plaintiffs had in this case no subsisting cause of action in point of law, in respect of their contract, we are of opinion that a verdict must be entered for the defendants.”