have left descendants, and in that case it operates in favour of these descendants. (3) Children legitimated by subsequent marriage shall have the same rights as if they had been born of that marriage.’... By the law of France, marriage makes the children of an illicit connection legitimate, although one of the spouses has, after the connection and the birth of the children, contracted a marriage with another person, and the parents have only married after the dissolution of that marriage. As the child legitimated is considered to be born of the marriage which has made him legitimate, he cannot participate in a succession which has opened before that marriage, though subsequent to his birth. For the same reason he cannot claim any preference, in respect of mere priority of birth, in any question of succession with the children of the intermediate marriage.... In Kerr v. Martin, which was elaborately discussed in the Court of Session, the question was raised, whether a marriage of either of the parents with a third person, after the birth of a natural child, formed a bar to legitimation by the subsequent marriage of the parents. Though the judges were divided in opinion, the Court, by a majority, decided that the child was legitimate, and that no mid-impediment was created by the intervening marriage.... In Scotland, legitimation by subsequent marriage confers upon a bastard the rights of a lawful child. Besides being entitled to legitim, he succeeds under a destination to lawful children. In any question with the children born of the bastard’s parents in lawful wedlock, he has the same civil rights, as regards succession and otherwise, as he would have enjoyed had he been born in lawful marriage. But where there is lawful issue of an intermediate marriage by one of the parents with a third person, a child legitimated by a second marriage seems only a lawful child of the family as becoming so by the second marriage, and therefore it is thought he can claim no preference in respect to primogeniture or priority of birth, which would have the effect of defeating or prejudicing the rights of succession of the children of the first marriage arising at their birth. According to this view, if the father had a natural son, and after this a lawful son by a marriage with a third person, and then entered into a second marriage with the mother of the bastard, the lawful son by the first marriage would be entitled to the Scotch heritage _ab intestato_, and could not be deprived of that right by the legitimation of the natural son arising from the _second_ marriage.”