Before proceeding to give examples of the evidence for spontaneous thought-transference, it may be well to repeat something of what has been said in the preceding chapter. In the first place, the narratives quoted in this book are offered as samples only of the evidence of this kind actually accumulated. No single narrative can afford to stand alone. Each contains one or more elements of weakness; and in the last resort chance coincidence, memory-hallucination, or even deliberate deception would be _in any single case_ a more probable explanation than a new mode of mental affection. It is only, to borrow Mr. Gurney's metaphor, as a faggot, and not as a bundle of separate sticks, that the evidence can finally be judged. But, in the second place, it is not claimed that the evidence reviewed even in its entirety is by itself sufficient to demonstrate the possibility of the affection of one mind by another at a distance. The main proof of such affection is based on the experiments already described, to which the spontaneous evidence so far adduced must be regarded as illustrative and in some degree auxiliary. It will be more convenient, as a matter of arrangement, that the spontaneous experiences first considered should be those which resemble most closely the results of direct experiment, though this classification has the disadvantage of placing in the forefront cases of the least definite and striking kind; cases, that is, which are most readily explicable as due to chance coincidence. It is on all grounds, therefore, expedient that the reader should reserve his final verdict until he has the whole case before him. In the present chapter there will be adduced instances of the spontaneous transference of (1) simple sensations; (2) ideas and mental pictures; (3) emotional states; (4) impulses tending to action. The first two classes, and in some measure the last, resemble the results described in the first five chapters of this book; for the third probably no direct experimental parallel can be offered, for the sufficient reason that vivid and intense emotion cannot be evoked at will. _Transference of Simple Sensations._ We will begin by quoting two instances of the transference of simple sensation. The first we owe to the kindness of Mr. Ruskin. The percipient was Mrs. Severn, wife of the well-known landscape painter. No. 41.--From MRS. ARTHUR SEVERN. "BRANTWOOD, CONISTON, _October_ 27_th_, 1883.