art, which he learns wonderfully well. It is quite possible to create an efficient navy out of landsmen, but the lack of natural seamen will always be a great handicap, which, doubtless, the Government will do its best to remove. It will thus be gathered that Argentina, in spite of her geographical position, is not by nature a sea Power, and indeed she appears to devote attention to the navy only under external pressure. It was apprehension of war with Chile during the boundary dispute that induced the Government to buy the _Buenos Aires_ in 1896, the _Garribaldi_ in 1897, and in 1898 the _San Martin_, the _Puerryedon_, and the _Belgrano_. Again, the present naval programme is due to the activity of the Brazilian naval preparations. The following table gives the strength of the fleet:-- ------+--------------------------+----------------+---------- Date. | Battleships. | Displacement | Speed in | | in Tons. | Knots. ------+--------------------------+----------------+---------- 1879 | _Almirante Brown_ | 4,267 | 14 1889 | _Independencia Libertad_ | 2,336 | 14 | | | | Armoured Cruisers. | | | | | 1894 | _Garribaldi_ | 6,840 | 20 " | _San Martin_ | 6,840 | 20 1896 | _Puerryedon_ | 7,000 | 20 " | _Belgrano_ | 7,000 | 20 | | | | Protected Cruisers. | | | | | 1889 | _25 de Maio_ | 3,200 | 22 1891 | _de Juilio_ | 3,500 | 22·5 1894 | _Buenos Aires_ | 4,500 | 24 ------+--------------------------+----------------+---------- [Illustration: CRUISER, _SAN MARTIN_.]