Mr. WALKER. In that case Mr. Sarony sought to sustain the validity of a copyright upon a photograph of that then very ornamental gentleman, Oscar Wilde. It turned out that in this picture which Mr. Sarony personally took of Oscar Wilde, in his esthetic costume at the time he captured the hearts of the American women by his highly ornamental appearance [laughter], Mr. Sarony had personally posed Oscar Wilde, so as to give him a peculiar beauty, which might not have been developed by the ordinary photographer; and the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the validity of that particular copyright upon the particular ground that Mr. Sarony put particular skill in the posing of the man so as to produce a particularly artistic effect. But if I should go into a photograph gallery and have somebody pose me who did not have that skill--and also because the subject would not admit of it, and would not produce any particularly attractive effect--and the attempt should be made to copyright that photograph, he would go right up against the decision of the Supreme Court in the Sarony case, and he would be told that the copyright was invalid, because it did not involve any intellectual effort in its production. Mr. CHANEY. I think your picture would influence the committee quite as much as Oscar Wilde's. [Laughter.] Mr. WALKER. Well, Oscar Wilde is dead, and not here to speak for himself; and I am living still. Mr. CHANEY. I hope you will live long, sir. Mr. WALKER. Thank you. The next case, and the last case in which these matters have been before the Supreme Court, is the case of Higgins _v._ Keuffel, decided by that tribunal in the October term of 1890, and reported in 140 U.S. In that case a copyright had been issued, in strict conformity with the copyright law of 1874, upon a label used for manufacturing purposes, as a label on a bottle or a package. There was no doubt whatever but what the copyright was in strict conformity with the statute, but the Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional, because although the label was a writing, it was not a writing in the sense that the Supreme Court had defined that word in the Trade-Mark cases. Here Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court, and he said: The clause of the Constitution under which Congress is authorized to legislate for the protection of authors and inventors is contained in the eighth section of Article 1, which declares that "the Congress shall have power to promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."