Although this bill purports to be founded on the Constitution, and although the Constitution is confined to the word "writings," that word "writings" does not appear among the 8,000 words of that bill. It is not there once. This bill is based upon the theory that Congress has power to grant an exclusive right to works, and the word "works" is used more than 30 times where the word "writings" ought to have been used, and the word "writings" is not printed in that bill from its beginning to its end. I am not reflecting upon any gentleman who drafted the bill in that way, because the bill was drawn upon the theory that the Constitution justifies copyright upon an author's works. Now, the word "works" includes "writings" and is far more comprehensive than "writings." Take the case of Theodore Roosevelt. He has published and printed 15 volumes of original works, and he has delivered without writing more than 1,500 speeches. Now, those books that he has printed and those speeches that he has delivered are equally his works, but they are not equally his writings, because he never has reduced those speeches to writing. So that there is a plain distinction between works and writings, and that distinction is recognized in this bill, as follows. (Now I will devote myself for the rest of the time to strict analysis.) SEC. 4. That the works for which copyright may be secured under this act shall include all the works of an author. Then twelve classes of works are enumerated. The third of those classes of works is said to be "oral lectures, sermons, and addresses." Now, those productions come under the head of works, and do not come under the head of writings, confessedly. Mr. BONYNGE. But they could not be copyrighted until they were reduced to writing, could they? Mr. WALKER. Yes; they could, under this bill. Mr. BONYNGE. How? Mr. CURRIER. What would you file in the copyright office? Mr. WALKER. You do not have to file anything for a year. Mr. CURRIER. I know that; but you have got to file something then. Mr. WALKER. But you get a year's copyright without ever doing that, and this bill would give a man a monopoly of a whole year on a speech never reduced to writing, and that is a "limited time." And if he chooses ever to reduce it to writing, then all he has got to do is to file one copy in the office of the Library of Congress and not publish it at all. Mr. CHANEY. Well, you must remember that we must confine this to copyrighted matter. Mr. WALKER. You must confine it quite narrowly, I think; but please let me develop my particular thought. It is perfectly plain that under this bill a man may have a copyright on an oral sermon, lecture, or address and maintain that copyright for a whole year without that discourse ever being even put into typewriting during that period. That is a perfectly plain case, therefore, of copyrighting a work that is not a writing.