Quality is that according to which Subjects are called Such and Such ([Greek: poioi/ tines]). It is, however, not a true genus, but a vague word, of many distinct, though analogous, meanings including an assemblage of particulars not bound together by any generic tie.[56] The more familiar varieties are--1. Habits or endowments ([Greek: e(/xeis]) of a durable character, such as, wise, just, virtuous; 2. Conditions more or less transitory, such as, hot, cold, sick, healthy, &c. ([Greek: diathe/seis]); 3. Natural powers or incapacities, such as hard, soft, fit for boxing, fit for running, &c. 4. Capacities of causing sensation, such as sweet of honey, hot and cold of fire and ice. But a person who occasionally blushes with shame, or occasionally becomes pale with fear, does not receive the designation of _such or such_ from this fact; the occasional emotion is a passion, not a quality.[57] [Footnote 56: See the first note on p. 66. Aristot. Categ. p. 8, b. 26: [Greek: e)/sti de\ ê( poio/tês tô=n pleonachô=s legome/nôn], &c. Compare Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, a. 33, and the Scholion of Alexander, p. 715, a. 5, Br. The abstract term [Greek: Poio/tês] was a new coinage in Plato's time; he introduces it with an apology (Theætet. p. 182 A.).] [Footnote 57: Aristot. Categ. p. 9, b. 20-33.] A fifth variety of Quality is figure or circumscribing form, straightness or crookedness. But dense, rare, rough, smooth, are not properly varieties of Quality; objects are not denominated _such and such_ from these circumstances. They rather declare position of the particles of an object in reference to each other, near or distant, evenly or unevenly arranged.[58] [Footnote 58: Ibid. p. 10, a. 11-24.] Quality admits, in some cases but not in all, both contrariety and graduation. Just is contrary to unjust, black to white; but there is no contrary to red or pale. If one of two contraries belongs to Quality, the other of the two will also belong to Quality. In regard to graduation, we can hardly say that Quality in the abstract is capable of more and less; but it is indisputable that different objects have more or less of the same quality. One man is more just, healthy, wise, than another; though justice or health in itself cannot be called more or less. One thing cannot be more a triangle, square, or circle than another; the square is not more a circle than the oblong.[59] [Footnote 59: Aristot. Categ. p. 10, b. 12; p. 11, a. 10, 11-24.] What has just been said is not peculiar to Quality; but one peculiarity there is requiring to be mentioned. Quality is the foundation of Similarity and Dissimilarity. Objects are called _like_ or _unlike_ in reference to qualities.[60] [Footnote 60: Ibid. p. 11, a. 15.]