"But here, perhaps, some man may ask whether those future things, which are called _contingents_, are necessary. I say, therefore, that generally all contingents have their necessary causes, but are called contingents in respect of other events, upon which they do not depend; as the rain, which shall be to-morrow, shall be necessary, that is, from necessary causes; but we think and say, it happens by chance, because we do not yet perceive the causes thereof, though they exist now. For men commonly call that _casual_ or _contingent_, whereof they do not perceive the necessary cause; and in the same manner they use to speak of things past, when not knowing whether a thing be done or no, they say, it is possible it never was done. "Wherefore, all propositions concerning future things, contingent or not contingent--as this, _It will rain to-morrow_, or this, _To-morrow the sun will rise_--are either necessarily true, or necessarily false; but we call them contingent, because we do not yet know whether they be true or false; whereas their verity depends not upon our knowledge, but upon the foregoing of their causes. But there are some, who, though they confess this whole proposition, _To-morrow it will either rain or not rain_, to be true, yet they will not acknowledge the parts of it, as _To-morrow it will rain_, or _To-morrow it will not rain_, to be either of them true by itself; because they say neither this nor that is true _determinately_. But what is this _determinately true_, but true _upon our knowledge_, or evidently true? And therefore they say no more, but that it is not yet known whether it be true or no; but they say it more obscurely, and darken the evidence of the truth with the same words with which they endeavour to hide their own ignorance."