[Footnote 44: M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the note to his translation (p. 197) calls it justly--"le possible qui n'est jamais; et qui par cela même, porte en lui une sorte d'impossibilité." It contradicts both the two explanations of [Greek: dunato\n] which Aristotle had given a few lines before. 1. [Greek: dunato\n o(/ti e)nergei=]. 2. [Greek: dunato\n o(/ti e)nergê/seien a)/n] (p. 23, a. 10).] [Footnote 45: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 23, a. 5. [Greek: tou=to me\n tou/tou cha/rin ei)/rêtai, o(/ti ou) pa=sa du/namis tô=n a)ntikeime/nôn, ou)d' o(/sai le/gontai kata\ to\ au)to\ ei)=dos. e)/niai de\ duna/meis o(mô/numoi/ ei)sin; to\ ga\r dunato\n ou)ch a(plô=s le/getai, a)lla\ to\ me\n o(/ti a)lêthe\s ô(s e)nergei/a| o)/n], &c. If we read the thirteenth chapter of Analytica Priora I. (p. 32, a. 18-29) we shall see that [Greek: to\ e)ndecho/menon] is declared to be [Greek: ou)k a)nagkai=on], and that in the definition of [Greek: to\ e)ndecho/menon], the words [Greek: ou(= mê\ o)/ntos a)nagkai/ou] are expressly inserted. When [Greek: to\ a)nagkai=on] is said [Greek: e)nde/chesthai], this is said only in an _equivocal_ sense of [Greek: e)nde/chesthai--to\ ga\r a)nagkai=on _o(mônu/môs_ e)nde/chesthai le/gomen.] On the meaning of [Greek: to\ e)ndecho/menon], translated above, in the table, "possible (logically) to be," and its relation to [Greek: to\ dunato/n], see Waitz, ad Organ. I. pp. 375-8. Compare Prantl. Gescht. der Logik, I. pp. 166-8.] [Footnote 46: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 21, a. 32: [Greek: to\ de\ mê\ o)/n, o(/ti doxasto/n, ou)k a)lêthe\s ei)pei=n o)/n ti; do/xa ga\r au)tou= ou)k e)/stin o(/ti e)/stin, a)ll' o(/ti ou)k e)/stin. To\ mê\ o)/n] is the true description of that which Aristotle improperly calls [Greek: du/namis ê(\ ou)de/pote e)ne/rgeia/ e)stin]. The triple enumeration given by Aristotle (1. Actuality without Potentiality. 2. Actuality with Potentiality. 3. Potentiality without Actuality) presents a neat symmetry which stands in the place of philosophical exactness.] The contrast of Actual and Potential stands so prominently forward in Aristotle's First Philosophy, and is, when correctly understood, so valuable an element in First Philosophy generally, that we cannot be too careful against those misapplications of it into which he himself sometimes falls. The sense of Potentiality, as including the alternative of either affirmative or negative--_may be or may not be_--is quite essential in comprehending the ontological theories of Aristotle; and when he professes to drop the _may not be_ and leave only the _may be_, this is not merely an equivocal sense of the word, but an entire renunciation of its genuine sense. In common parlance, indeed, we speak elliptically, and say, _It may be_, when we really mean, _It may or may not be_. But the last or negative half, though not expressly announced, is always included in the thought and belief of the speaker and understood by the hearer.[47]