[Footnote 36: Aristot. Sophist. Elench. p. 184, a. 1, b. 2: [Greek: dio/per tachei=a me\n a)/technos d' ê)=n ê( didaskali/a toi=s mantha/nousi par' au)tô=n; ou) ga\r te/chnên a)lla\ ta\ a)po\ tê=s te/chnês dido/ntes paideu/ein u(pela/mbanon . . . . _peri\ de\ tou= sullogi/zesthai pantelô=s ou)de\n ei)/chomen pro/teron a)/llo le/gein, a)ll' ê)\ tribê=| zêtou=ntes polu\n chro/non e)ponou=men_.]] The preceding abridgment of Aristotle's exposition of the Syllogism applies only to propositions simply affirmative or simply negative. But Aristotle himself, as already remarked, complicates the exposition by putting the Modal propositions (Possible, Necessary) upon the same line as the above-mentioned Simple propositions. I have noticed, in dealing with the treatise De Interpretatione, the confusion that has arisen from thus elevating the Modals into a line of classification co-ordinate with propositions simply Assertory. In the Analytica, this confusion is still more sensibly felt, from the introduction of syllogisms in which one of the premisses is necessary, while the other is only possible. We may remark, however, that, in the Analytica, Aristotle is stricter in defining the Possible than he has been in the De Interpretatione; for he now disjoins the Possible altogether from the Necessary, making it equivalent to the Problematical (not merely _may be_, but _may be or may not be_).[37] In the middle, too, of his diffuse exposition of the Modals, he inserts one important remark, respecting universal propositions generally, which belongs quite as much to the preceding exposition about propositions simply assertory. He observes that universal propositions have nothing to do with time, present, past, or future; but are to be understood in a sense absolute and unqualified.[38] [Footnote 37: Analyt. Prior. I. viii. p. 29, a. 32; xiii. p. 32, a. 20-36: [Greek: to\ ga\r a)nagkai=on o(mônu/môs e)nde/chesthai le/gomen]. In xiv. p. 33, b. 22, he excludes this equivocal meaning of [Greek: to\ e)ndecho/menon--dei= de\ to\ e)nde/chestha lamba/nein mê\ e)n toi=s a)nagkai/ois, a)lla\ kata\ to\n ei)rême/non diorismo/n.] See xiii. p. 32, a. 33, where [Greek: to\ e)nde/chesthai u(pa/rchein] is asserted to be equivalent to or convertible with [Greek: to\ e)nde/chesthai mê\ u(pa/rchein]; and xix. p. 38, a. 35: [Greek: to\ e)x a)na/gkês ou)k ê)=n _e)ndecho/menon_]. Theophrastus and Eudemus differed from Aristotle about his theory of the Modals in several points (Scholia ad Analyt. Priora, pp. 161, b. 30; 162, b. 23; 166, a. 12, b. 15, Brand.). Respecting the want of clearness in Aristotle about [Greek: to\ e)ndecho/menon], see Waitz's note **ad p. 32, b. 16. Moreover, he sometimes uses [Greek: u(pa/rchon] in the widest sense, including [Greek: e)ndecho/menon] and [Greek: a)nagkai=on], xxiii. p. 40, b. 24.] [Footnote 38: Analyt. Prior. I. xv. p. 34, b. 7.]