[Footnote 29: In this chapter of the Analytica, Aristotle designates
the present fallacy by the title, _Non per Hoc_, [Greek: ou) para\
tou=to--ou) para\ tê\n the/sin sumbai/nei to\ pseu=dos]. He makes
express reference to the Topica (_i.e._ to the fifth chapter of
Sophist. Elenchi, which he regards as part of the Topica), where the
same fallacy is designated by a different title, _Non Causa pro
Causâ_, [Greek: to\ a)nai/tion ô(s ai)/tion tithe/nai]. We see
plainly that this chapter of the Anal. Priora was composed later than
the fifth chapter of Soph. El.; whether this is true of the two
treatises as wholes is not so certain. I think it probable that the
change of designation for the same fallacy was deliberately adopted.
It is an improvement to dismiss the vague term Cause.]
[Footnote 30: Ibid. II. xvii. p. 66, a. 11: [Greek: e)pei\ tau)to/ ge
pseu=dos sumbai/nein dia\ pleio/nôn u(pothe/seôn ou)de\n i)/sôs
a)/topon, oi(=on ta\s parallê/lous sumpi/ptein], &c.]
[Footnote 31: Ibid. II. xviii. p. 66, a. 16-24: [Greek: o( de\
pseudê\s lo/gos gi/netai para\ to\ prô=ton pseu=dos], &c.]
In impugning the thesis and in extracting from your opponent the
proper concessions to enable you to do so, you will take care to put
the interrogations in such form and order as will best disguise the
final conclusion which you aim at establishing. If you intend to
arrive at it through preliminary syllogisms (prosyllogisms), you will
ask assent to the necessary premisses in a confused or inverted
order, and will refrain from enunciating at once the conclusion from
any of them. Suppose that you wish to end by showing that A may be
predicated of F, and suppose that there must be intervening steps
through B, C, D, E. You will not put the questions in this regular
order, but will first ask him to grant that A may be predicated of B;
next, that D may be predicated of E; afterwards, that B may be
predicated of C, &c. You will thus try to obtain all the concessions
requisite for your final conclusion, before he perceives your drift.
If you can carry your point by only one syllogism, and have only one
middle term to get conceded, you will do well to put the middle term
first in your questions. This is the best way to conceal your purpose
from the respondent.[32]
[Footnote 32: Analyt. Prior. II. xix. p. 66, a. 33-b. 3: [Greek:
chrê\ d' o(/per phila/ttesthai paragge/llomen a)pokrinome/nous,
au)tou\s e)picheirou=ntas peira=sthai lantha/nein.--ka)\n di' e(no\s
me/sou gi/nêtai o( sullogismo/s, a)po\ tou= me/sou a)/rchesthai;
ma/lista ga\r a)\n ou(/tô la/nthanoi to\n a)pokrino/menon.] See the
explanation of Pacius, p. 385. Since the middle term does not appear
in the conclusion, the respondent is less likely to be prepared for
the conclusion that you want to establish. To put the middle term
first, in enunciating the Syllogism, is regarded by Aristotle as a
perverted and embarrassing order, yet it is the received practice
among modern logicians.]
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