Complete cognition ([Greek: to\ e)nergei=n], according to the view here set forth) consists of one mental act corresponding to the major premiss; another corresponding to the minor; and a third including both the two in conscious juxta-position. The third implies both the first and the second; but the first and the second do not necessarily imply the third, nor does either of them imply the other; though a person cognizant of the first is _in a certain way, and to a certain extent_, cognizant of _all_ the particulars to which the second applies. Thus the person who knows Ontology (the most universal of all sciences, [Greek: tou= o)/ntos ê(=| o)/n]), knows _in a certain way_ all _scibilia_. Metaphys. A., p. 982, a. 21: [Greek: tou/tôn de\ to\ me\n pa/nta e)pi/stasthai tô=| ma/lista e)/chonti tê\n katho/lou e)pistê/mên a)nagkai=on u(pa/rchein; ou(/tos ga\r _oi)=de/ pôs_ pa/nta ta\ u(pokei/mena.] Ib. a. 8: [Greek: u(polamba/nomen dê\ prô=ton me\n e)pi/stasthai pa/nta to\n sopho\n ô(s _e)nde/chetai, mê\ kath' e(/kaston e)/chonta e)pistê/mên au)tô=n_.] See the Scholia of Alexander on these passages, pp. 525, 526, Brandis; also Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 86, a. 25; Physica, VII. p. 247, a. 5. Bonitz observes justly (Comm. **ad Metaphys. p. 41) as to the doctrine of Aristotle: "Scientia et ars versatur in notionibus universalibus, solutis ac liberis à conceptu singularum rerum; ideoque, _etsi orta est à principio et experientiâ_, tradi tamen etiam iis potest qui careant experientiâ."] [Footnote 43: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, b. 3: [Greek: to\ ga\r e)pi/stasthai le/getai trichô=s, ê)\ ô(s tê=| katho/lou, ê)\ ô(s tê=| oi)kei/a|, ê)\ ô(s tô=| e)nergei=n; ô(/ste kai\ to\ ê)patê=sthai tosautachô=s.]] [Footnote 44: Ibid. b. 5: [Greek: ou)de\n ou)=n kôlu/ei kai\ ei)de/nai kai\ ê)patê=sthai peri\ au)to/, plê\n ou)k e)nanti/ôs. o(/per sumbai/nei kai\ tô=| kath' e(kate/ran ei)do/ti tê\n pro/tasin kai\ mê\ e)peskemme/nô| pro/teron. u(polamba/nôn ga\r ku/ein tê\n ê(mi/onon ou)k e)/chei tê\n kata\ to\ e)nergei=n e)pistê/mên, ou)d' au)= dia\ tê\n u(po/lêpsin e)nanti/an a)pa/tên tê=| e)pistê/mê|; sullogismo\s ga\r ê( e)nanti/a a)pa/tê tê=| katho/lou.] About erroneous belief, where a man believes the contrary of a true conclusion, adopting a counter-syllogism, compare Analyt. Post. I. xvi. p. 79, b. 23: [Greek: a)/gnoia kata\ dia/thesin].] It is impossible, however, for a man to believe that one contrary is predicable of its contrary, or that one contrary is identical with its contrary, essentially and as an universal proposition; though he may believe that it is so by accident (_i.e._ in some particular case, by reason of the peculiarities of that case). In various ways this last is possible; but this we reserve for fuller examination.[45]